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STATE REGULATION OF PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE RATES
MICHAEL D. RosE*
The author presents an exhaustive analysis of rate control in prop-
erty and casualty insurance, molding the data to predict future reg-
ulatory patterns and offering guidance which may serve the needs
of the insurers, the public, and the state and federal governments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance regulation is an enormous subject. It involves such
diverse matters as licensing agents, approving policy forms, regulating
investments, conducting examinations of companies' financial records,
and policing reserve requirements. This analysis focuses on one aspect
of insurance regulation: the control of rates charged for property and
casualty insurance, with particular emphasis upon fire, extended cover-
age, and allied lines of insurance. This area of regulation is important,
not only because it affects all business firms and nearly all households
in the United States, but also because rate regulation has been the
subject of considerable controversy in recent years.
In 1966, premiums written by approximately 1,220 property and
casualty companies totaled over twenty and two-tenths billion dollars.
Property and casualty insurance includes a variety of forms but two
groups of insurance accounted for a major portion of the business. In
1966, ten billion dollars was paid in premiums for automobile insur-
ance, which includes automobile injury liability, automobile property
damage, and automobile physical damage. Two and two-tenths billion
dollars was paid for fire, extended coverage, and allied lines insurance,
which includes losses caused by fire and lightning, damage resulting
from smoke and water, damage caused by windstorm, hail, explosion
or riot, and such perils as sprinkler leakage and earthquakes. Two and
four-tenths billion dollars was paid for multiple peril insurance, which
includes package policies covering numerous kinds of property and
casualty lines for homeowners and businesses, previously covered by
individual policies. Two and five-tenths billion dollars was paid for
workmen's compensation insurance, which is not considered in this
study since many states provide this insurance, rather than private in-
surers. One and two-tenths billion dollars was paid for miscellaneous
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bodily injury and property damage liability coverage such as products
liability insurance and professional malpractice insurance. Five hun-
dred million dollars was paid for inland marine insurance, which
refers to various coverages for property being transported from one
place to another, other than by ocean transit. Other forms of property
and casualty insurance include ocean marine, crop-hail, boiler and
machinery, and glass insurance, but each of these lines generates a
relatively small premium volume each year.'
It is convenient to think of property and casualty insurance as a
separate industry since virtually all lines of insurance in this industry
share common problems concerning regulatory rules and rate making
practices. Fire, extended coverage, and allied lines insurance is partic-
ularly suitable for analysis since this coverage has had the longest
history of regulation in the United States and has recently merged to
some extent with another type of insurance of recent development, the
multiple peril line.
Within such setting this analysis is concerned with the public
control of price competition through rate regulation. Among the facets
of the subject considered are the historical development and structure
of the instruments of control and the problems involved in effecting
such control. The central purpose is to identify the reasons for rate
regulation and to analyze the fundamental issues involved.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATE REGULATION OF INSURANCE
From 1868 to 1944 it was generally believed that insurance was
not commerce and was therefore immune from federal regulation. This
notion originated with Paul v. Virginia,' which involved a Virginia
insurance agent who represented several New York fire insurance
companies. The agent refused to comply with the Virginia law which
required a deposit of bonds with the state treasurer from agents
representing out-of-state companies. Nevertheless, the agent issued
an insurance policy and was fined for acting without a license.3 On
appeal, Mr. Justice Field said, writing for a unanimous Court:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. The
policies are simple contracts of idemnity [sic] against loss by fire,
entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a con-
sideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles of
commerce in any proper meaning of the word .... Such contracts
are not inter-state transactions, though the parties may be domiciled
1 1967 Spectator Property, Liability Insurance Index 3.
2 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
3 For the events leading up to and analysis of Paul v. Virginia, see Nehemkis, "Paul
v. Virginia: The Need for Re-examination," 27 Geo. LJ. 519, 526-33 (1939).
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in different States. The policies do not take effect-are not executed
contracts-until delivered by the agent in Virginia. They are, then,
local transactions, and are governed by the local law. They do not
constitute a part of the commerce between the States any more
than a contract for the purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by
a citizen of New York whilst in Virginia would constitute a portion
of such commerce.4
The Court's finding that the business of insurance was not com-
merce, although sweeping and subject to considerable criticism, was
rigidly adhered to in a number of subsequent cases.
In Hooper v. California' an insurance agent was convicted for
failing to file a bond required by a California statute before writing
insurance on behalf of a company not incorporated in that state. The
agent claimed that the contract, being one for ocean marine insurance,
was a matter of interstate commerce and as such was beyond the reach
of state authority. The Court rejected this contention and held:
This proposition involves an erroneous conception of what con-
stitutes interstate commerce. That the business of insurance does not
generically appertain to such commerce has been settled since the
case of Paul v. Virginia ....
Whilst it is true that in Paul v. Virginia, and in most of the
cases in which it has been followed, the particular contract under
consideration was for insurance against fire, the principle upon
which these cases were decided involved the question of whether
a contract of insurance, of any kind, constituted interstate com-
merce.
6
Although in the Paul case the Court had said that "issuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce," in Hooper the Court
declared that "The business of insurance is not commerce."'
One of the more important cases involving the extent of state
control was presented in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County.8 It was asserted that a tax levied by a Montana county on
certain assets of an insurer was "illegal, unlawful and void for that
... said tax and the levy and collection thereof was and is a burden
upon interstate commerce . . . ."I The majority opinion of the Court,
adverting to the earlier decisions regarding whether insurance was in
interstate commerce, said that these constituted a formidable body of
authority and strongly invoked the sanction of the rule of stare decisis.
4 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 183.
155 U.S. 648 (1895).
6 Id. at 653.
7 Id. at 655.
8 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
9 Id. at 499.
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To reverse these cases, said the Court, would require it to promulgate
a new rule of constitutional inhibition upon the states and would compel
a change in their policy and a readjustment of their laws. Such a result
moved the Court not to change its position."°
The majority were of the opinion that the rationale of Paul v.
Virginia was exhaustive of the general principle and that "it would
rack ingenuity to attempt to vary its expression or more aptly illustrate
it."" The Court was not impressed by the volume of business and its
geographical extent; nor, said the Court, did the intrastate character
of the contracts change by their numbers or the residences of the
parties. All the decisions pertaining to New York Life were rendered
in New York. Its Montana agent was authorized to receive applications
for insurance solely for the purpose of transmitting them to the home
office. Thus, the use of the United States mails was essential to prac-
tically every step in the transaction of its business. The company's
argument that the use of the mails constituted a "current of commerce
among the states" failed to persuade the Court to alter the established
view, for the reason that "This use of the mails is necessary, it may be,
to the centralization of the control and supervision of the details of
the business; it is not essential to its character." 2
In all these cases in which the Supreme Court held that insurance
was not commerce, the argument on behalf of the contrary view was
advanced by an insurance company or agent to establish the principle
10 Id. at 502.
11 Id. at 508. This was the view of Mr. justice Jackson dissenting in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) [hereinafter referred to as
SEUAI, discussed in detail in section IV infra.
Cf. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928), where Mr. justice Holmes, dissenting, referred to Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and said: "If I am right the fallacy has resulted in an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which no lapse
of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." Ten years
later the Court overruled Swift v. Tyson which had been hallowed by almost a century
of existence. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 509 (1913). The
three cases mentioned were the most significant in establishing the principle that insurance
was not commerce, although there were several others in which the Court reiterated the
same conclusion: Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 432 (1935); Bothwell v. Buckbee,
Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1927); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260
U.S. 71, 75 (1922); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918);
Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553 (1902) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178
U.S. 389, 401 (1900); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899); Noble v. Mitchell,
164 U.S. 367, 370 (1896); Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 118 (1886);
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566, 573 (1870); Ducat v.
Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410, 415 (1870).
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that insurance was not only commerce, but interstate commerce, and
was therefore not subject to state regulation. As noted in section IV
infra, in the early 1940's the insurance industry reversed its position
and argued that its activities were not in interstate commerce and
therefore were not subject to federal regulation.
A. Attempts to Legislate Federal Control
The industry sought relief through federal legislation to supplant
existing state schemes. In 1866 and 1868 bills were introduced in
Congress to create a national bureau of insurance.13 These bills resulted
from the irritation of the insurance companies from what they regarded
as burdensome and unnecessary multitudinous state regulatory and tax
legislation.14 Having failed to gain federal legislation, the insurance
industry then attempted to attack state regulation and taxation in the
courts. Paul v. Virginia was the first test case.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Hooper v. California,"5 bills
were again introduced in the Senate and House for the purpose of
creating a national bureau of insurance and declaring that insurance
companies doing business outside the state of their incorporation were
deemed to be engaged in interstate commerce. None of these bills
became law.'6
In 1905 President Roosevelt requested that Congress consider
whether the power of the Bureau of Corporations could not be extended
to cover interstate insurance transactions, but the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary declined to recommend legislation on the
theory that Congress had no power to regulate insurance. 7 The House
committee stated that Congress was powerless to act since the Supreme
Court had held many times that insurance was not commerce.' 8
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 9 resolutions were introduced in the Senate
and the House, proposing a constitutional amendment to permit Con-
gress to regulate the insurance business," but these resolutions failed
13 S. 299, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868) ; H.R. 738, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
14 Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 523-26.
"r 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
16 H.R. 15092, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); S. 7277, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1904);
H.R. 16274, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1904); H.R. 7054, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1903); H.R.
13791, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1904) ; S. 2736, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897).
17 S. Rep. No. 4406, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 2491, 59th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1906).
18 See SEUA, 322 U.S. 533, 575 (1944).
19 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
20 S.J. Res. 58, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915); S.J. Res. 103, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914); H.R.J. Res. 194, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
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to come out of committee. In 1933, a similar resolution was introduced
and also died in committee.2 1 For the next decade the industry seemed
resigned to state regulation and taxation since no further proposals
were made to effect federal control.
These legislative proposals prompted one writer to comment that
the insurance industry's enthusiasm for federal regulation in the late
1800's and early 1900's was probably because the industry
considered it more advantageous to be regulated by a toothless,
laissez-farish mastiff like the Federal Government than by those
smaller but possibly more harassing watch dogs, the individual
states.22
As to the complete change of position of the industry following the
Supreme Court's decision in 1944,23 holding that insurance was in
interstate commerce (this decision is discussed in section IV infra),
the same commentator remarked:
Perhaps, subsequently, some of the insurance industry's chagrin
at vexatious and repetitious state regulation ... [was] supplanted
by a fear that the indolent federal mastiff... [had] cut its wisdom
teeth and .. . [was] threatening to impose regulation of unknown
effectiveness. 24
B. Marine Insurance Exception
While in the late 1800's and early 1900's the Supreme Court
adhered to the concept that the insurance business was not interstate
commerce, the Court in Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
United States25 suggested that contractual relations which are essential
to interstate commerce should be brought within the definition of such
a concept. This case involved a corporation, engaged in the ocean
marine insurance business, which was taxed under the War Revenue
Act of 1898.26 The tax was assailed by the company as being in sub-
stance a tax upon exportation and hence invalid. Although in two
earlier cases27 the Court unequivocally held that ocean marine insur-
ance was not in interstate commerce, in Thames & Mersey Marine Ins.
Co. it modified this, saying:
Let it be assumed, as this Court has said, that the insurance
21 S.J. Res. 51, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
22 Timberg, "Insurance and Interstate Commerce," 50 Yale L.J. 959, 969 n.42 (1941).
23 SEUA, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
24 Timberg, supra note 22.
25 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
26 Ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448 (1898).




business, generically considered, is not commerce; that the contract
of insurance is a personal contract .... The inquiry still remains
whether policies of insurance against marine risks during the voyage
to foreign ports are not so vitally connected with exporting that the
tax on such policies is essentially a tax upon the exportation itself
* . . It cannot be doubted that insurance during the voyage is by
virtue of the demands of commerce an integral part of the exporta-
tion; the business of the world is conducted upon this basis.28
For this reason the Court declared invalid the federal stamp tax on
ocean marine insurance policies. As a result of the decision, members
of the marine insurance industry feared that they might be subject to
the federal antitrust laws on the theory that the decision brought
insurance within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act.2 9
The ocean marine insurance industry persuaded Congress that
the implications of the case were serious enough that Congress should
grant the industry an exemption from the antitrust laws, although prior
efforts of the insurance industry to have the federal government
exercise jurisdiction over insurance had failed. Undoubtedly Congress
was more amenable to consider the problems of the ocean marine
industry since immediately after World War I Congress was eager to
develop a strong American merchant marine fleet. Thus, in 1920, the
first insurance exemption from the federal antitrust laws was granted
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 885(b) 0 of the act
provides:
Nothing contained in the "antitrust laws" ... shall be construed
as declaring illegal an association entered into by marine insurance
companies for the following purposes: To transact a marine insur-
ance and reinsurance business . . . and to reinsure or otherwise
apportion among its membership the risks undertaken by such
association or any of the component members.
In granting the exemption, Congress relied on what it thought were
unique characteristics of ocean marine insurance. In a report just prior
to the passage of the Merchant Marine Act, a House subcommittee
stated that marine insurance was more than a fundamental agency
of commerce since its importance extended beyond the ordinary service
of protecting property and credit. Insurance has a use as a competitive
weapon in international trade and therefore the advantages of possess-
ing strong, independent underwriting facilities were considered undeni-
able. The subcommittee went on to note that serious legislative burdens
and restrictions confronted American companies; these burdens and
28 237 U.S. 19, 25-26.
29 See discussion in S. Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-69 (1960).
3o 46 U.S.C. § 885(b) (1958), ch. 250, § 29, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
restrictions were regarded as unnecessary and largely traceable to a
shortsighted policy, dictated by local desires, which viewed marine
insurance as a purely state matter rather than as a national institution.
The remedy to the problem was to be found in (1) self-help on the
part of American companies through cooperative action, especially in
the formation of a comprehensive insurance bureau for reinsurance
purposes, (2) federal assistance, and (3) state help through the re-
moval of legislative restrictions which prohibited rate combinations.
Federal legislation was recommended to assure marine underwriters
of the legality of combinations designed to facilitate reinsurance or to
extend underwriting activities to foreign countries. Such legislation was
deemed necessary since a number of underwriters told the subcom-
mittee that they feared the legal consequences that might attach to
the creation of such associations or combinations. Thus the subcom-
mittee concluded: "[I] t will be advisable, and even if unnecessary can
do no harm, to free all such co-operative efforts from the possible opera-
tion of the Sherman and Clayton Anti-trust Acts."'"
Whether the exemption was wise is questionable. In 1959, hearings
on the ocean marine insurance industry were conducted by the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. In its findings and con-
clusions the subcommittee expressed great concern (1) that after
forty years under the Merchant Marine Act only a single syndicate
existed with a virtual monopoly on hull insurance business under-
written in the United States; (2) that the agreements under which
that syndicate operates restrict freedom of entry into the business and
discourage price competition; (3) that such restrictions possibly con-
stitute boycott, coercion, or intimidation, which are not within the
protection of the exemption; (4) that although the FTC investigated
the industry between 1950 and 1956, it was dilatory in its study and
failed to refer to the Department of Justice evidence elicited indicating
possible Sherman Act violations; and (5) that the Federal Maritime
Board (charged with the responsibility of creating a national indepen-
dent marine insurance business) also had been remiss in its duties.32
III. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE INSURANCE RATE REGULATION:
1800's-1944
Under the umbrella of exclusive state regulation of insurance,
detailed laws were enacted in every state in the 1800's and early 1900's
to protect the public from various problems and practices of insurance
companies. There were laws to protect policyholders against loss
31 Quoted in S. Huebner, Marine Insurance 203-08 (1920).
32 S. Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-08 (1960).
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through insolvency of insurers and laws dealing with the policy forms
companies could use. Long and extremely detailed annual statements
covering insurers' businesses during the year, and year-end financial
statements, were required to be filed with the state insurance depart-
ments. Most states provided for the licensing of insurance agents and
brokers. Every state had an insurance department to supervise the
business of insurance2 3 In contrast to these methods of state regula-
tion, rate regulation is of more recent origin. In 1927, Professor Patter-
son described it as "embryonic"; 4 even after thirty more years he said
that it was much less sophisticated and thorough than public utility
rate regulation3'
A. Fire Insurance
Until the mid-1800's insurance practices were virtually free of
government control in the United States. In 1850 the first state in-
surance commissioner was appointed and shortly thereafter several
other states established administrative offices to oversee insurance
practices.3 6 But state control was ineffective in remedying the problems
surrounding the boom-or-bust business cycle in the fire insurance in-
dustry. When losses were low and profits handsome, new companies
entered the market. No artificially imposed barriers impeded entry and
no substantial economies of scale existed to discourage entrants. As a
result of the vigorous, unimpeded competition in the 1800's, premiums
failed to cover operating costs and by 1877 approximately 3,000
companies had failed. Motivated by the desire to survive and prosper,
in 1866 companies organized The National Board of Fire Underwriters
"to establish and maintain, as far as practicable, a system of uniform
rates of premium. 37 Although The National Board of Fire Under-
writers was rather ineffective in stabilizing rates, the late 1800's marked
the development of a structure for concerted rate making which remains
substantially intact today. The National Board of Fire Underwriters
gradually shifted its energies to fire prevention and statistical compila-
33 See Brook, "Public Interest and the Comnissioners'-All Industry Laws," 15 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 606 (1950). See also E. Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner
in the United States 26S-83 (1927), for a detailed discussion of state rate regulation in
the early 1900's.
34 Patterson, supra note 33, at 268.
3G In 1955, Patterson said it was still "one of the least effective phases of insurance
regulation." E. Patterson, Cases and Materials on Insurance 43 (3d ed. 1955).
36 See "Hearings on the Insurance Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at 4840
(1960). [The hearings are in twelve parts and are hereinafter cited as Hearings.]
37 Quoted in Kimball & Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation:
The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Prospective," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 548 (1958).
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tions, while regional associations provided the vehicle for companies to
fix their rates in concert,38 with the attendant stiffing of competition.
The era of the "muckrakers" and "trust busters" around the turn
of the century responded by attempting to meet the thriving insurance
compacts head-on: twenty-two states enacted laws prohibiting member-
ship in associations which fixed rates.39 These anticompact laws were
relatively ineffective in deterring cooperative rate making among the
insurance carriers, although the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld a statute prohibiting combinations of fire insurance companies
for the purpose of fixing rates and commissions' and a statute which
allowed an insured or beneficiary to recover a twenty-five percent
penalty, in addition to actual loss or damage, if the insurer was con-
nected with a rate making association. 41 The Court held that fire
insurance companies, acting together, may have property owners prac-
tically at their mercy concerning rates and may thus have the power to
deprive the public of the advantages flowing from competition. To
meet these evils, the states could adopt corrective regulatory patterns.42
The carriers were undeterred. In the face of legislature proscrip-
tions, they felt compelled not to continue the historical pattern of
destructive rate wars, which often grievously harmed innocent policy-
holders with meritorious, but unsatisfied claims. In those states where
the anticompact laws applied only to domestic companies or failed to
include agents, the law was readily circumvented. In jurisdictions with
more rigorously drafted statutes, companies promulgated so-called ad-
visory rates. Rate books were sold to companies by an "independent"
bureau or informal confidential clubs were formed to remedy industry
problems.'
As a result of the chaotic patterns of development of the insurance
business in the 1800's and early 1900's, a widely held belief developed
-that because of certain unique characteristics of the property and
casualty insurance industry, unregulated rate competition was unde-
sirable. Such rates should be regulated by the states under their police
powers as an activity affected with the public interest. Some of the
characteristics commonly cited were: (1) The insurance contract is
a technical and complicated financial document which is hard for many
buyers to understand and even harder to evaluate in terms of probable
38 F. Crane, Automobile Insurance Rate Regulation 54 (1962).
39 SEUA, 322 U.S. 533, 555 n.43 (1944).
40 Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
41 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911).
42 Id. at 316.
43 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 390, 94 So. 7, 14 (1922) ; State
ex inf. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S.W. 595 (1899).
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benefits. (2) The policyholder has a contract calling for possible future
performance that depends upon the solvency of the insurer; without
this there is no insurance at all. (3) Intensive, unregulated competition
may result in rates which provide insufficient funds to meet contractual
liabilities. (4) Cooperatively established rates may lead to a monopolis-
tic situation, resulting in excessive and unfair premiums. (5) The price
of insurance cannot be determined by costs which have been incurred.
Insurance costs depend upon future events which in property and
casualty insurance may or may not occur. (6) The cost of the service
promised is greatly disproportionate to the price paid. (7) The conse-
quences of an insurance company failing are more serious than in other
businesses.44
B. Beginning of Rate Regulation
Early in the twentieth century regulation of insurance rates
began." In 1909, Kansas adopted the first rate regulatory law affecting
property and casualty insurance. Every fire insurer had to file its rates
and rating plans with the superintendent of insurance, and no changes
were effective without ten day's notice to the superintendent. If any
rate was deemed excessive or inadequate, the suprintendent could order
the insurer to file a higher or a lower rate commensurate with the
character of the risk. Rate discrimination was prohibited.
When the superintendent ordered a general reduction in fire rates,
the German Alliance Insurance Company notified him that its was com-
plying under protest. The company filed suit alleging that the statute
was unconstitutional. The circuit court upheld the statute as a proper
exercise of a state's police power and observed that although fire
insurance is a private business, in the future it would undoubtedly be
regarded as affected with the public interest. 6 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision and designated insurance as a
"business affected with a public interest."47
Following the San Francisco fire in 1909, causing substantial rate
increases by all property and casualty insurers, the New York legisla-
44 See Cowell, Federal Regulation of Insurance 6 (1948); Marryott, "Why Regulate
Insurance Rates?," 1946 Proceedings, A.B.A. Sec. of Ins. 305, 309-12. See also Dineen,
Gardner & Procter, "The Economics and Principles of Insurance Supervision," in Insurance
and Government 1, 15-19 (Center & Heins eds. 1962) ; Stelzer, "The Insurance Industry
and the Antitrust Laws: A Decade of Experience," 1955 Ins. L.J. 137.
45 W. Wandel, The Control of Competition in Fire Insurance 134 (1935).
46 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 189 Fed. 769, 778 (D. Kan. 1911).
47 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). See also O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); National Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260
U.S. 71 (1922).
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ture appointed the Merritt Committee to commence a sweeping investi-
gation of fire insurance rate making procedures. The committee reached
the conclusion that the anticompact approach was a failure because
unrestricted competition invited rate wars, resulting in discriminatory
rates and a dangerous lowering of the quality of protection afforded by
insurers." Joint action in rate making was deemed essential.49 The
conclusions of the committee are significant since their rationale is the
foundation of present day state regulation. The committee report de-
clared:
It is therefore recommended that no anti-compact bill be passed,
but that in place thereof a statute be enacted that will permit com-
bination under State regulation, such regulation to stop short of
actually fixing the price at which companies shall sell their insur-
ance, but which shall be of such positive nature that all forms of
discrimination in rates will cease; such statute to provide for the
filing by such associations and bureaus of all schedules and specific
rates with the Insurance Department, and also that all such associa-
tions and bureaus shall be subject to the closest supervision by the
Superintendent of Insurance, and further that all such associations
and bureaus shall keep careful records of their proceedings, and
provide for the hearing of interested property-owners who feel
aggrieved at the rates charged-all to the end that the potent power
of publicity may operate freely to cure any arbitrary action or
indefensible methods.50
The report led to the enactment of legislation in New York which
expressly permitted fire insurers to combine for the purpose of fixing
rates and which empowered the insurance superintendent to supervise
the activities of fire rating bureaus.5 1 Bureaus were to establish the
rates charged by member companies. Before their use these rates
were to be filed with the state insurance superintendent for approval.
The committee was persuaded that fire rating organizations or bureaus
were desirable since they could (1) produce more credible statistical
data for rate making, (2) reduce the expense of rate making by central-
izing the function, (3) provide fewer rate structures for state authori-
ties to investigate, and (4) assist the state in policing the application of
rate structures. This recognition of the importance of cooperation in
insurance rating marked the beginning of a sharp trend away from
48 Rep. of N.Y. Merritt Comm., Assembly Doc. No. 30, 134th Sess. 42 (1911).
49 Id. at 76.
Go Id. at 129.
51 See Stoddard, The State Supervisor and Regulation of Insurance Rates, 1922 Pro-




antitrust and anticompact legislation which had prevailed up to that
point. 2
In 1914, a committee of the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners reported the failure of the anticompact laws to bring
about open competition 3 and recommended state legislation recogniz-
ing and regulating rate bureaus and prohibiting discriminatory prac-
tices." Passage of laws making membership or cooperation in public
rating bureaus compulsory was also urged." These recommendations
did not attempt to remedy the power of combinations of companies to
charge excessive rates. Compulsory membership in a rate bureau may
eliminate inadequate rates, but it also suppresses competition and
entrenches monopoly control. One must remember, however, that it
was not until this same year that the states first found themselves
clearly possessed with the power to control rates.56 In 1914, the Su-
preme Court in German Alliance Ins. v. Lewis" expanded the concept
of "affected with a public interest" to give the states regulatory power
over insurance rates.
After 1914 every state sought to regulate rates. Generally the
legislative standard imposed was that rates not be inadequate, discrim-
inatory, or excessive. Today this same standard is incorporated into
almost every state statute. From 1914 to 1944 state control of fire
insurance rates, though diverse, was basically of two kinds. Some
statutes reflected the earlier, somewhat naive, simple opposition to
rate making combinations, while others reflected the more sophisticated
recognition of the need for concerted action under public control.
Twelve states had no explicit rate regulatory statutes, but only anti-
combination provisions. Four of these anticombination provisions
were directed specifically at insurance, prohibiting combinations to
control insurance rates, while the other eight were general anti-
monopoly provisions in statutes or state constitutions. Fourteen states
52 For a discussion of the relative merits of competition and cooperation and con-
flicting legislation, see Riegel, "Rate-making Organizations in Fire Insurance," 70 Annals
172 (1917). The trend toward legislation permitting cooperation is traced in a sequel:
Riegel, "The Regulation of Fire Insurance Rates," 130 Annals 114 (1927).
53 1915 Proceedings (Adjourned meetings), Natl Convention of Ins. Comm'rs 20.
54 Id. at 19-21.
55 Id.
56 See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 416 (1914). See also German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 316 (1911); Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Clay, 197 Fed.
435, 436 (E.D. Ky. 1912) ; Bell v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 146 Ky. 841, 143
S.W. 388 (1912); Rep. of N.Y. Merritt Comm., Assembly Doc. No. 30, 134th Sess. 50-51
(1911), commenting upon regulatory steps taken by Kansas, Texas, and Louisiana.
57 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
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had anticompact provisions directed specifically to insurance, and
forbidding combinations except as authorized by cognate rate regu-
latory statutes. Fifteen states had general antimonopoly statutes or
constitutional provisions in addition to rate regulatory statutes. Four
states had only rate regulatory provisions. Thus by 1944 thirty-three
states had rate regulatory machinery, usually coupled with antimonop-
oly provisions."8 The effectiveness of control varied from purely paper
machinery in some states to relatively complete, effective control in
others. In New York, prior to their use, rates were filed by insurers or
rating organizations and were approved or disapproved by the state.
In Texas, the state actually made and promulgated rates. Even in states
with fairly effective control of fire insurance rates, the control was
relatively ineffective or altogether lacking in other lines.59
C. Casualty Insurance
Prior to the mid-1940's no discernible regulatory pattern existed
in any casualty line except workmen's compensation insurance. Most
regulation centered on discriminatory practices.60 Automobile insurance
rates had to be filed for approval by a state regulatory entity in only
a handful of jurisdictions. 1 In general, rate competition flourished in
the casualty industry.62
IV. UNITED STATES V. SOUTH-EASTERN UNDERWRITERS Ass'N
Until 1944 state regulation rested on the assumption that insur-
ance was not commerce and therefore was not subject to federal control.
The states believed that they had the sole power to regulate insurance.
In the SEUA63 case the Supreme Court held that if the activities of an
insurer are conducted across state lines, it is engaged in interstate
commerce and is subject to federal regulation.
58 This classification and count is from Note, 33 Geo. L.J. 70, 73-S0 (1944). A some-
what different classification and count is to be found in Brief of Appellant, at 130-31,
SEUA, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See also "Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Comm.
on the judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270," 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as joint Hearings].
59 Moser, "Operation of Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern," 15 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 523, 526 (1950).
6o C. Kulp, Casualty Insurance 623 (rev. ed. 1942).
61 Id. at 626, 627.
62 Moser, supra note 59, at 527.
63 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The decision has been extensively commented on. See Powell,
"Insurance as Commerce," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1944); 29 Marq. L. Rev. 55 (1944);
20 Ind. L. Rev. 184 (1947); Note, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 772 (1944); Highsaw, "Insurance as
Interstate Commerce: An Analysis of the Underwriters Case," 6 La. L. Rev. 24 (1944);
19 St. John's L. Rev. 56 (1944); Harrington, "An Exploration of the Effects of the
S.E.U.A. Decision," 1944 Ins. L.J. 590.
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The catalyst which precipitated the case had its origins in 1922 when
the Missouri superintendent of insurance ordered a reduction in fire
insurance rates. Pending the final disposition of the litigation, ten
million dollars, representing the disputed portion of the premiums, was
impounded." Disposition of this sum triggered almost two hundred
lawsuits 5 After approximately twenty years of legal maneuvering
among the litigants, the Missouri superintendent of insurance was
bribed to recommend a settlement favorable to the insurance compan-
ies. Tax investigations revealed the fraud. 6  The proceedings convinced
Missouri's attorney general that the interstate character of the insur-
ance industry left him powerless to deal effectively with the manifest
abuses. Consequently, he consulted the United States Attorney General
for advice. The latter became convinced that insurance was commerce
and that the federal antitrust laws were applicable. The Department of
Justice decided to test this hypothesis in the SEUA case.6 7
An indictment was filed in a district court in Georgia against the
South-Eastern Underwriters Association (an unincorporated associa-
tion of stock fire companies doing business in Alabama, Florida, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia), twenty-seven of
its officers, and one hundred ninety-eight of the member companies.
The indictment charged an agreement (1) to fix rates for fire and
certain allied lines of insurance, (2) to fix commissions, (3) to adopt
reclassifications of risks on which basis rates are fixed, (4) to adhere
to standard terms, conditions, and clauses in insurance contracts, (5)
to withhold reinsurance facilities from nonmembers of the South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, (6) to withdraw from and refuse
to enter into agencies representing nonmembers, (7) to boycott and
withhold patronage from purchasers of insurance from nonmembers,
(8) to disparage the services and facilities of nonmembers, (9) to
maintain rating bureaus to police these agreements, and (10) to main-
tain boards and groups of agents for the same purpose.68 Six charges-
(1), (2), (3), (4), (9), and (10)-involved rate-fixing; three charges
-(5), (6), and (7)-involved boycotts; the remaining charge--(8)-
64 322 U.S. 533, 562-63, 583 (1944).
65 See cases cited in joint Hearings 110 (1943).
66 American Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F. Supp. 896 (WD. Mo. 1940), 38 F. Supp. 926
(WI). Mo. 1941); United States v. Pendergast, 39 F. Supp. 189 (W.). Mo. 1941). See also
Missouri v. American Ins. Co., 355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1 (1946), for numerous citations
to related cases.
67 joint Hearings 25-26 (1943). See also Elmore, "How Insurance Became Com-
merce," J. Am. Ins., July 1945, at 4, for the events preceding the SEUA decision.
68 See Transcript of Record at 1-15, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (NJ). Ga. 1943).
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related to slander. The validity of the last charge is questionable since
the defendants were not accused of making any specific false state-
ments, and for one to allege that his competitor's product or service is
less desirable hardly amounts to an actionable wrong.
The gravamen of the indictment was the rate fixing charge. If a
group of owners or manufacturers of a product agree upon a stated
price, the agreement violates the federal antitrust laws, regardless of
whether the prices are or are not reasonable. 9
In August 1943, the district court judge sustained a demurrer to
the indictment," relying on the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia and its
progeny. 1 The essence of his reasoning was
To constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, the restraint and
monopoly denounced must be that of interstate trade or commerce
72
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held ... that the business
of insurance is not commerce, either intrastate or interstate . . .73
If there is to be any overruling of the long line of clear and
thoroughly considered decisions of the Supreme Court, acquiesced
in for seventy-five years by Congress and administrative agencies,
it will have to be done by the Supreme Court itself, or by Congress.74
69 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
70 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga.
1943).
71 In support of his statement that the business of insurance is not commerce, the
judge cited the following cases as examples of those in which the Supreme Court so
declared "unequivocally and unambiguously," id. at 713: Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927); New
York Life Ins. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); New York Life Ins. v.
Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367 (1896); Hooper v. Cali-
fornia, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) ; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
72 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713 (N.D. Ga.
1943).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 715. Unlike the district court for the Northern District of Georgia which
faithfully adhered to Paul v. Virginia and the succeeding cases, the court of appeals in
Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 643
(1944), said:
The support which these cases afford petitioner's contention is not so real as
first impression might indicate. Certainly they are not decisive. It must be noted
that in each of them the Court was considering the power of the State to tax or
regulate, and not the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. It has fre-
quently been held that the line which marks the beginning of the state's power to
tax or regulate is not the terminal boundary of federal power.
This language is a concise summary of the majority opinion in the SEUA decision.
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The government appealed the decision directly to the Supreme
Court" and secured a four-to-three reversal of the district court's
decision.76 In writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Black first artfully
dodged the seventy-five years of precedent that insurance policies and
the insurance business were not commerce. He did this by pointing out
that these prior cases involved the validity of state regulation or tax-
ation and not an act of Congress. Mr. Justice Black observed that for
the first time in the history of the Court the SEUA case presented the
issue of whether the commerce clause grants to Congress the power to
regulate interstate insurance transactions. He reasoned that fire insur-
ance transactions stretching across state lines constitute "commerce
among the several States" so as to make them subject to regulation by
Congress under the commerce clause. The reason for this is because
there
is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the
states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy
obligations, and the countless documents and communications
which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy con-
tracts.77
Next, he reasoned that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit con-
duct of fire insurance companies which restrained or monopolized inter-
state fire insurance activities, even though considerable precedent had
been developed by the Court prior to the enactment of the Sherman
Act that insurance was not commerce. Black reached this conclusion
by reasoning that "not one piece of reliable evidence" exists "that the
Congress of 1890 intended to freeze the proscription of the Sherman
Act within the mold of then current judicial decisions defining the
commerce power."17
In a lengthy dissent Mr. Chief Justice Stone took a much narrower
view of the issue of whether insurance was in interstate commerce.
Although he admitted that "the business of insurance as presently
conducted has in many aspects such interstate manifestations and such
effects on interstate commerce as may subject it to the appropriate
7G The authority for direct appeals is the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 682
(1965), permitting direct appeals to the Supreme Court where judgments below setting
aside or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment are based solely on the invalidity or con-
struction of a statute. See also United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U.S. 442, 444 (1943).
76 The majority consisted of Justices Black, Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge; the
minority of Chief Justice Stone and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. Justices Roberts
and Reed did not sit. The latter disqualified himself because his son represented the SEUA.
77 SEUA, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944).
78 Id. at 557.
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exercise of federal power,"" he reasoned that the focus of the indict-
ment was only on the formation of insurance contracts, which Stone
argued were purely intrastate in character and that the incidental use
of facilities of interstate commerce does not change the policies' intra-
state character. And, contrary to Black, Stone concluded that from the
legislative history of the Sherman Act it was clear that the act was not
intended to govern insurance transactions. Subsequently, the Mc-
Carran Act affirmatively applied the Sherman Act to the insurance
business. Basically, Stone rested his analysis on a narrowly defined
concept of insurance, adhering to the precedent of the Court, in order
to preserve the existing regulatory and tax framework of the states
developed in reliance upon the precedent.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Jackson admitted that if the Court
were considering the question for the first time, he
would have no misgivings about holding that insurance business is
commerce and where conducted across state lines is interstate com-
merce and therefore that congressional power to regulate prevails
over that of the states.80
But he was of the opinion that the Court should not reverse the trend
of state taxation and regulation that had developed following Paul v.
Virginia and its progeny. Since insurance had "acquired an established
doctrinal status not based on present-day facts,"81 which has been long
acted upon by the Court, the states, and Congress, Jackson reasoned
that "common sense and wisdom," rather than the "abstract logic" of
the majority82 should be followed since both the state and federal
governments had accommodated the structure of their laws to the
error. He concluded that the way to effect federal supervision of in-
surance was through legislation, not judicial fiat.8"
A. Reaction to the SEUA Decision
The SEUA decision was immediately attacked for allegedly re-
versing a practice instituted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in 1834.
For example, Professor Charles Warren wrote in the New York Times:
[I] t should be noted that the decision on a constitutional ques-
tion of vast importance was rendered by a minority of the full court.
This decision, therefore, reverses a wise practice of the court
instituted by Chief Justice Marshall's court 110 years ago, in 1834,
whereby the court then voluntarily asserted that it would not decide
79 Id. at 563.
80 Id. at 586.
81 Id. at 588.
82 Id. at 589.
83 Id. at 593.
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any case involving a constitutional question unless a majority of the
whole court should concur.
84
However, one of the dissenters, Mr. Justice Jackson, admitted that
insurance is commerce, but dissented to preserve the doctrine of stare
decisis. Also the split of the Court did not revolve around a constitu-
tional interpretation as such, for none of the dissenters denied the
power of Congress to take needed regulatory action.85
Many individuals were shocked by the decision and predicted
grave consequences, seizing on the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson
that
The Court's decision at the very least will require an extensive over-
hauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision.
The whole legal basis will have to be reconsidered .... Certainly
the states lose very important controls and very considerable
revenues.
8 6
These critics released an emotional outburst concerning the decision.
"Dislocations are so numerous and the task of repair is so extensive
that attention is focused upon obvious and immediate necessities" of
taxation and rating.8 7 "[T]he decision... [has] a devastating impact
upon the entire system of state regulation built up, through trial and
error, over a period of more than seventy-five years."8 8 As a result of
the decision, the right of states "to continue to regulate the business ...
[is] in jeopardy," 89 creating a "vast void of uncertainties."8 " Congress
regarded the decision as "precedent-smashing." 91 Newspapers raised a
hue and cry about the decision.9" The industry predicted that the
natural result of increased competition arising from the decision would
render many companies insolvent.93 The industry argued that existing
regulatory statutes were designed to preserve solvency, and that the
application of the federal antitrust laws to exclude state regulation
would have a disastrous result. 4 Following the decision some companies
84 N.Y. Times, June 8, 1944, at 16, col. 4.
85 See Note, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 772 (1944).
86 SEUA, 322 U.S. 533, 590 (1944).
87 E. Sawyer, Insurance as Interstate Commerce v (1945).
88 Id. at $0.
89 Beach, 'The South-Eastern Underwriters' Decision and Its Effect," 1947 Wis. L.
Rev. 321, 322.
90 McCarran, "Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 Notre Dame Law.
299, 302 (1948).
91 90 Cong. Rec. 6524-25 (1944). See also H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1945).
92 See Note, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 772, 773 n.10 (1944).
W3 H.R. Rep. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1944).
94 See 91 Cong. Rec. 1092 (1945).
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refused to abide by state regulatory provisions or to pay state taxes,
on the theory that such regulation and taxation were unconstitutional
restraints on interstate commercef 5
Undoubtedly these protests are subject to the barb of the first Mr.
Justice Harlan, voiced forty years before the SEUA decision:
It is the history of monopolies in this country and in England
that predictions of ruin are habitually made by them when it is
attempted... to restrain their operations and to protect the public
against their exaction ....
The suggestions of disaster to business have ... their origin
in the zeal of parties who are opposed to the policy underlying the
act of Congress or are interested in the result of this particular
case . . .96
Professor Patterson stated the point more picturesquely:
I suspect that many of those who now oppose federal regulation
of insurance do so chiefly because they fear that it will be more
efficient and thorough than state regulation. Like the frogs in
Aesop's fable, they would have a log as king rather than a stork.97
Although the decision shocked many persons and aroused con-
siderable apprehension concerning its possible implications, the decision
had been foreseen by several observers.9 Professor Willis, long an ad-
vocate of the idea that insurance is interstate commerce, and a severe
critic of Paul v. Virginia, rejoiced in the decision, stating that the
Court had "done a fine piece of work.""9 Professor Patterson was opti-
mistic about the implications of the decision, for he observed that it
was unlikely that the basic plan of state supervision of insurance would
be overturned by the Supreme Court as a result of its decision in the
SEUA case.00 But he went on to say that the chief threat to continued
state supervision was not from the Supreme Court, but from Con-
gress.1°1 Patterson's remarks seem sound. They clearly reflect the ob-
ervations of Mr. Justice Black in the majority's opinion. Black an-
95 S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945); H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1945); 91 Cong. Rec. 478-79 (1945).
96 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351-52 (1904).
97 Patterson, "The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," 23 Texas L. Rev. 18,
30 (1944).
98 See Berke, "Is the Business of Insurance Commerce?," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 409
(1943); Dodd, "The Decreasing Importance of State Lines," 27 A.BAJ. 73, 84 (1941);
Timberg, "Insurance and Interstate Commerce," 50 Yale L.J. 959 (1941); Nehemkis,
"Paul v. Viginia: The Need for Re-examination," 27 Geo. L.J. 519 (1939).
99 Willis, "United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,"
1944 Ins. LJ. 390.




swered Jackson's contention that the states had lost "very important
controls and very considerable revenues," 0 2 by pointing out:
[T]here is a wide range of business and other activities which,
though subject to federal regulation, are so intimately related to
local welfare that, in the absence of Congressional action, they
may be regulated or taxed by the states. In marking out these
activities the primary test applied by the Court is not the mechanical
one of whether the particular activity affected by the state regula-
tion is part of interstate commerce, but rather whether, in each case,
the competing demands of the state and national interests involved
can be accommodated. And the fact that particular phases of an
interstate business or activity have long been regulated or taxed
by states has been recognized as a strong reason why, in the
continued absence of conflicting Congressional action, the state
regulatory and tax laws should be declared valid.10 3
This observation of Mr. Justice Black was the basis of the Court's
decision in Robertson v. California,"4 decided two years after the
SEUA case. In the Robertson case, the Court held that the insurance
business is within the states' concurrent power over commerce. As
long as Congress has not preempted the field, the states are free to
regulate in the exercise of their police powers. Consequently, the Court
upheld a California statute which limited the activities of unadmitted
insurers or unlicensed agents.10
B. Implications of Parker v. Brown
In addition to the rather reassuring comments of Mr. Justice
Black in the SEUA decision regarding the validity of state regulation
and taxation, another consideration supported the efficacy of state
control. This consideration, as Black suggests, seems to have been
virtually ignored by the numerous critics of the decision.
The opinion in Parker v. Brown,"" decided a year before the
SEUA case, furnished support to the idea of the states' establishing
insurance rates, without such rates being subject to the federal antitrust
laws.07 The Court held that state action or sanctions running counter
102 SEUA, 322 U.S. 533, 590 (1944).
103 Id. at 548.
104 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
105 The Court decided the case independently of the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-15 (1965), ch. 209, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, discussed in section V infra.
100 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
107 See Note, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223, 228-29 (1947); Guiher, "United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n: Its Impact on Existing Federal Statutes," 1944-48 Proceedings,
A.B.A. Sec. of Ins. 33-37; E. Sawyer, Insurance as Interstate Commerce 149-50 (1945),
for an indication that the insurance companies had much hope for the Parker doctrine
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to the policies of the Sherman Act are valid because the Sherman Act
was intended to apply to private activity restraining trade and not to
prohibit an act of government. The main issue in the case was whether
agricultural programs sanctioned and administered by the State of
California violated the Sherman Act. The state programs were intended
to benefit raisin producers by regulating the supply reaching the
market. The action of the state officials consisted of (1) granting
permission to institute the programs, (2) approving or modifying sug-
gested programs, and (3) enforcing the programs through sanctions
provided by the legislature.
The type of state law which clearly conflicts with the Sherman
Act would be one which authorized a private combination of insurance
companies to fix rates without approval of any state authority. The
states cannot nullify federal antitrust laws by authorizing private
persons or groups subject to the antitrust laws to do what such laws
forbid. As the Court stated in Parker, "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful."'1o8 In 1944, this limitation
would seem to have nullified the activities of rate bureaus in probably
only five states, where the laws expressly or impliedly authorized or
required rate bureaus to establish rates which were not subject to the
approval or disapproval of any governmental agency. In eleven other
states in which bureau rates were operative unless disapproved by the
state, the Sherman Act might have applied to such rates, depending on
how they were established. If approved by the state commissioner, or
established independently by him (as was possible in nine of the eleven
states), they probably would have been regarded as an act of the state.
In the remaining thirty-two states, six expressly had forbidden com-
panies to combine for the making of rates; thirteen did not authorize
such conduct in any way. In six states, rating bureaus were authorized
only to make actuarial recommendations, but not joint agreements on
rates. In five states, rates were determined by rate bureaus, but did
not become effective until state approval had been obtained. In Texas
the rates were fixed by the state; in Nevada the rates of every fire
insurer had to be filed with and approved by the state commissioner
before they became effective."0 9
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v.
prior to federal legislation in the form of the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1965),
ch. 209, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended.
108 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
109 For a tabulation of the laws of the states in relation to the doctrine of Parker v.
Brown, see Brief for Appellant, at 27-31, SEUA, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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Calvert Distillers Corp."0 in 1951, the Parker doctrine may have been
put on a somewhat narrower pedestal than one might have thought it
had previously occupied. The Sckwegmann Bros. case involved the
attempt of two distillers, Calvert and Seagram, to enjoin Schwegmann
Brothers, New Orleans supermarket operators, from cutting the prices
of their branded liquor products in sales at retail. Schwegmann Broth-
ers had refused to enter into a resale price-fixing agreement with the
distillers, and the latter sought to stop the price-cutting by invoking
the "nonsigner" clause of the Louisiana Fair Trade Act. The Court
held that the action could not be maintained on the ground that the
efforts of the distillers to impose price control upon an unwilling dealer
amounted to a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, unprotected by
the Miller-Tydings amendment to that act. The Parker and Schweg-
mann Bros. decisions suggest that where both the initiation and en-
forcement of prices by private parties is completely discretionary under
a state statute, no protection from the federal antitrust laws arises. If
one reads these decisions together, the conclusion reached seems to be
that for state action to shield private parties from the federal antitrust
laws, the state must not merely authorize the activities proscribed by
federal law, it must compel such activities and impose sanctions against
those who do not comply or otherwise exercise positive controls."'
C. Impact of the SEUA Decision on State Taxation of Insurance
The SEUA decision left open the question of taxation of interstate
insurance activities." 2 Yet one may argue that the Court did not intend
to impair state premium taxes because four years prior to the decision
in SEUA the Court upheld a sales tax levied by New York City on coal
transported in interstate commerce and delivered in the city."' The
similarity between a sales tax and premium tax (essentially a sales tax
collected at the source), and the reasoning of the Court in the Mc-
Goldrick case, is strongly persuasive evidence that the Court would
have upheld state premium taxes.
Other decisions of the Court also support this conclusion. For
example, in one case the Court commented on the decisions upholding
110 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
111 See Rahi, "Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws:
Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.," 46 Ill. L. Rev. 349, 360-72
(1951), for a discussion of the type of state action necessary to cloak private action with
impregnability from the Sherman Act.
112 For a discussion of the impact of the SEUA case on state tax laws, see, e.g.,
Orfield, "Improving State Regulation of Insurance," 32 Minn. L. Rev. 219, 254-58 (1948);
Tye, "The Aftermath of the S.E.U.A. Case," 23 Taxes 610 (1945).
113 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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state taxation by saying that it had sustained nondiscriminatory taxes
on sales to buyers within taxing states of commodities shipped inter-
state in performance of sales contracts, not upon the ground that
delivery was not a part of interstate commerce, but because the taxes
were not a prohibited regulation of, or burden on, interstate com-
merce." 4 The Court noted that it had previously upheld the states'
power to regulate interstate prices and rates of a local character so
long as interstate commerce was not unduly burdened, which is deter-
mined by weighing and accommodating the competing demands of
state and national interests." 5
With respect to the constitutional limitations upon the power of a
state to tax insurance contracts consummated outside its borders be-
tween its citizens and unlicensed foreign insurers, various cases' 16 have
held that a state has no power to regulate or tax these insurance or
reinsurance contracts, even though the property or risks covered are
located within the state. The rule is otherwise where the foreign in-
surer was or has been licensed in the state and had sent agents or
engineers to inspect risks or otherwise represent the company's inter-
ests. 117
More recently the Supreme Court invalidated as, a violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a five percent tax
on gross premiums paid by any person to any unlicensed insurer for
insurance on Texas risks placed other than through an agent licensed
in Texas. A New York corporation doing business in Texas insured its
property in Texas with an insurance company not licensed in Texas
and which had no agents, office, or place of business in Texas and
neither solicited business nor investigated risks or claims in that state.
The contracts were negotiated, the policies issued, and the premiums
paid outside Texas. All losses under the contracts were adjusted and
paid outside the state."'
114 Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 505 (1942).
115 See Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods. Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939);
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Port Richmond &
Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317 (1914).
The SEUA decision did not involve an attack on state legislation. If it had and the
Court struck down state regulation of interstate insurance transactions, then the purported
jeopardy of state taxation of insurance would have been justified.
116 See Connecticut Gen. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
117 See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940). See also Hoopeston Co. v. Culen, 318
U.S. 313 (1943).
118 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962). Cf. Ministers Life
& Cas. Union v. Haase, 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205




Following the SEUA decision four basic alternatives were feasible:
(1) A system of federal control could have been created, perhaps
comparable to federal regulation of railroads. (2) The insurance
industry could have operated on a freely competitive basis, without a
protective system of state laws, and subject to existing federal laws.
(3) Congress could have granted the insurance business a blanket
exemption from federal regulation. (4) Congress could have preserved
state regulation as it existed prior to 1944 by establishing a limited
exemption from federal control. Alternatives 1 and 2 were never seri-
ously considered. Congress rejected alternative 3 in favor of alterna-
tive 4.
Pending the Supreme Court's decision in SEUA, there were unsuc-
cessful attempts to exempt the insurance business from the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, although the proposals failed to include an exemp-
tion from the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 19 The arguments in
favor of such legislation were simply that the states had always regu-
lated the business of insurance and that this regulation had been com-
plete and effective. 12 0 One reason for the failure of this legislation to
pass was a survey conducted by the Department of Justice which pur-
portedly revealed that about one-half the states in which rating bureaus
operated had inadequate provisions for regulating insurance companies,
leaving the public at the mercy of price-fixing combinations, which are
illegal per se under the Sherman Act. 2 ' Another reason the legislation
failed to be enacted was Attorney General Biddle's statement that the
Department would take no action until the insurance companies had
time to adjust their practices to accommodate themselves to the SEUA
decision, and until Congress had an opportunity to act. 2 2 Furthermore,
the proposed bills did not receive the support of the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) nor of other major segments
of the industry. The bills were sponsored by stock companies which ad-
hered to rate bureau practices."e The NAIC countered this plan, which
would have provided a complete exemption, with its own proposal. 24
119 S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). These proposed
bills are criticized in Threadgill, "Insurance Under the Sherman Act," 32 Geo. L.J. 66
(1943).
120 See Joint Hearings.
121 See joint Hearings 55-57, 142 (1943).
122 Joint Hearings 635-36 (1944).
123 See Mertz, "The First Twenty Years-A Case-Law Commentary on Insurance
Regulation under the Commerce Clause," 1963-64 Proceedings, A.B.A. Sec. on Ins., Neg. &
Comp. L. 153, 157 [hereinafter cited as Mertz].
124 For the full text of the NAIC bill and the statement which accompanied it, see
90 Cong. Rec. A. 4403-08 (1944).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The McCarran-Ferguson Act introduced in January 1945125 made
many structural changes in the NAIC proposal and was itself amended
several times' 26 before enactment on March 9, 1945.127 But it retained
the basic concept of the NAIC proposal-that voluntary action in con-
cert is sanctioned when regulated by the states. In authorizing the
continued control of the insurance business by the states, rather than
devising a federal regulatory scheme, Congress was motivated by two
considerations: It feared the chaos that purportedly might accompany
disruption of well-established patterns of state regulation and taxa-
tion; 121 and it was persuaded that the states were better equipped than
the federal government to regulate insurance because of their proximity
to the "local" insurance industry's problems and because of their
experience and presumed expertise in regulating the industry. 9
The core of the McCarran Act is sections 2 and 3, which provide:
Section 2(a). The business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law, enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided, That after January 1, 1948, [later
extended to June 30, 1948] ... the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton
Act . . ., and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act . . shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law.
Section 3(a). Until January 1, 1948, [later extended to June
30, 1948] ... the Sherman Act,... the Clayton Act, and the...
Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the
business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b). Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
The phrase in section 2(b), "to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law," is the major source of problems in state
rate regulation and will be discussed in detail in section VII infra.
The purpose of section 3 (a) was to grant the opportunity to the
states to enact appropriate legislation to regulate insurance under
125 91 Cong. Rec. 330 (1945).
126 For the legislative history of the act, see Note, "A Year of S.E.UY.," 23 Chi-Kent
L. Rev. 317 (1945).
127 1 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1965), ch. 209, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, [herein-
after referred to as the McCarran Act].
128 S. Rep. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
129 See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1087 (1945); 90 Cong. Rec. 6532 (1944).
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section 2 (b) and to the insurance companies to revise their practices
to conform with such legislation and with section 3 (b).'3
One of the most puzzling, and unresolved, questions about the
Act is raised by section 3 (a). The problem is to what extent, if at all,
after June 30, 1948, does the Robinson-Patman Act apply to the
insurance business, whether or not the types of practices proscribed by
that act are regulated by the states. The uncertainty stems from two
sources. First, does the Robinson-Patman Act apply to insurance since
its various sections refer only to the sale of "commodities," "goods,"
"wares," and "merchandise." Second, what inference should one draw
from the fact that while section 3 (a) of the McCarran Act mentions the
Robinson-Patman Act among the statutes suspended until July 1,
1948, section 2 (b) does not mention it as one of the statutes made
applicable to insurance at the end of the moratorium, unless ousted by
state regulation. Much has been said and written on both sides of this
issue." 1 Approximately half the states have concluded that state regu-
lation in this area is prudent and have enacted laws authorizing the
common practice of insurance companies paying commissions to an
insurance broker, acting on behalf of an insured 32 -a practice which
might violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
The network of highly restrictive rules developed prior to 1944
which were designed to insulate insurance agencies and, in turn, com-
panies from competition came directly in the line of fire of section 3 (b)
of the McCarran Act. This section provides that the Sherman Act is
applicable to agreements to, or acts of, boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion, regardless of whether the states undertake to "regulate" these
activities.133
130 See 91 Cong. Rec. 1442-44 (1945).
131 Compare Stone & Campbell, "Insurance and the Robinson-Patman Act," 1949
Ins. L.J. 553, with Glassie, "Insurance and the Robinson-Patman Act: Revisited," 1957
Ins. L.J. 85. See also Navjoks, "Regulation of the Insurance Business and Public Law 15
79th Congress, First Session," 30 Marq. L. Rev. 77 (1946); Beach, "The South-Eastern
Underwriters' Decision and Its Effects," 1947 Wis. L. Rev. 321, 324.
132 See Mertz at 228-29 for citations to these statutes.
133 References to such rules may be found in the SEUA opinion, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
II S. Whitney, Antitrust Policies 374 (1958); State of New York, Report of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation 19-20 (1948); Butler, "Activi-
ties of Agents under the McCarran Act," 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 568 (1950). These
practices included (1) the single counter rule-that a company could have only one agent
in an area; (2) the limitation of agency rule-that a company could have only an agreed
number of agents in an area; (3) the territorial limitation rule-that certain agents could
write business only in certain parts of a designated territory; and (4) the reinsurance rule
-that members of a rate bureau could not grant reinsurance to non-member companies.
Most of the practices have been discontinued. Before the SEUA decision, the Insurance
Executives Association voted to abandon such of these rules that it had previously partici-
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VI. ALL-INDusTRY BILLS
Although the McCarran Act did not impose any obligation on the
states to enact new rate regulatory laws, Senator McCarran remarked
that "Congress held out an invitation to the states to deal affirmatively
and effectively with those activities and practices of the insurance
business which might otherwise be subject to federal regulation."'1 34
Congress was persuaded that collaborative rate-making was clearly
desirable. For example, Senator Ferguson observed:
This bill would permit-and I think it is fair to say that it is
intended to permit-rating bureaus . . . . I think the insurance
companies have convinced many members of the legislature that we
cannot have open competition in fixing rates on insurance.' 35
A. NAIC-AIC Joint Committee
Within approximately three years after the McCarran Act, almost
every state, as a result of two strong groups, passed detailed laws which
regulated the rate making procedure for practically all lines of prop-
erty and casualty insurance.
One group was the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC). The various state commissioners undoubtedly did
not want to lose their exclusive jurisdiction over the industry nor did
they wish to have their prerogatives weakened or reduced. The McCar-
ran Act provided them a unique opportunity to strengthen and expand
their powers under the guise of states' rights. 36 The potential intrusion
and subsequent domination by the federal government in insurance
regulation probably was the overriding concern of the state commis-
sioners. These anxieties concerning the intrusion of the federal govern-
ment into their domain were somewhat neurotic since the Supreme
Court's decisions in Robertson v. California137 and Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin' 38 reaffirmed the validity of existing state control. Never-
pated in and wrote to 700 local associations that they would no longer be bound by them.
II S. Whitney, Antitrust Policies 374 (1958). In 1950 the National Association of Insur-
ance Agents notified its state associations that it would no longer aid in the enforcement
of these rules. In many states Department of justice proceedings precipitated their
abandonment, e.g., United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949 (NJ).
Ohio 1960), 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956); United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch.,
148 F. Supp. 915 (ED. La.), aff'd, per cvriam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
134 McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium under Public Law 15
Expired July 1," 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 540 (1948).
135 91 Cong. Rec. 1481 (1945).
136 See Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'-All Industry Laws," 15
Law & Contemp. Prob. 606, 608 (1950).
137 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
138 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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theless, the commissioners sought more comprehensive legislation effect-
ing their control over rate making practices. In addition to these fears
of the commissioners, it has been charged that the leading force in the
NAIC for new, more stringent, rate legislation was the New York
superintendent of insurance, who allegedly reflected the desire of the
major rate bureau companies based in New York to be shielded by
protective legislation.'39
The other group responsible for the passage of these laws was the
All-Industry Committee (AIC). The committee was organized in May
1945 at a joint meeting of the Federal Legislation Committee of the
NAIC and representatives of the insurance industry "to aid in the
formation of a legislative program to strengthen existing state laws
within the meaning of section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act."' 4 This com-
mittee consisted of nineteen members.' Of the nineteen, six had no
interest in the rating requirements of the fire and casualty model bills
which were ultimately drafted because either the bills expressly ex-
empted their lines of insurance142 or they did not write fire or casualty
business.143 Of the four organizations representing agents or brokers,
at least two were actively opposed to the rigor of the bills.144 A third
organization 145 was divided in its -position. It formally declared that
the members of each state organization were free to exercise their own
139 Patterson, "At the Crossroads," Best's Fire & Cas. News, April 1947, at 32, 52.
140 Quoted in Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'-All Industry Laws,"
15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 606, 608 n.14 (1950).
141 American Institute of Marine Underwriters, American Life Convention, American
Mutual Alliance, American Reciprocal Association, Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Companies, Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, Bureau of Personal Acci-
dent and Health Underwriters, Health and Accident Underwriters Conference, Inland
Marine Underwriters Association, Insurance Executives Association, Life Insurance Asso-
ciation of America, National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents, National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers, National Association of Insurance Agents, National Associa-
tion of Insurance Brokers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, National
Board of Fire Underwriters, National Fraternal Congress of America, and Surety Associa-
tion of America. 1946 Proceedings, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 362-63 [hereinafter cited
as Proceedings].
142 The model fire bill exempted ocean marine insurance, and the casualty bill
exempted accident and health insurance. Hence, the American Institute of Marine Under-
writers, the Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters, and the Health and
Accident Underwriters Conference had no concern in these bills except to see that they
retained these exemptions.
143 The American Life Convention, the Life Insurance Association of America, and
the National Fraternal Congress of America did not write fire or casualty policies.
144 National Association of Insurance Brokers and National Association of Casualty
and Surety Agents. Patterson, "At the Crossroads," Best's Fire & Cas. News, April 1947,
at 32, 53; Brook, supra note 136, at 608 n.17.
14r National Association of Insurance Agents.
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judgment in accordance with their conception of the public interest. The
fourth group represented the interests of mutual companies. Of the nine
remaining organizations, three represented participating insurers.146
Any legislation which would require or tend to establish uniform rates
would work to the advantage, at least in the short run, of insurers oper-
ating on a participating basis. Although participating insurers may ad-
here to rates fixed by a bureau, they can ultimately undercut these rates
by paying dividends to their policyholders. The remaining five members
of the AIC represented fire and casualty companies which had been fix-
ing their rates in concert.147 From this description of the interests repre-
sented in the drafting of the model rate regulatory bills, it is clear
that the interests of the rate bureaus dominated the picture.
B. Model All-Industry Casualty and Fire Insurance Rating Bills
After lengthy deliberation and extensive compromise regarding
the degree of state legislative control required under the McCarran
Act, 48 the joint NAIC and AIC committee agreed to submit two
146 American Mutual Alliance, American Reciprocal Association, and Associated Fac-
tory Mutual Insurance Companies. Brook, supra note 136, at 608 n.19.
A participating insurer is one which distributes to its policyholders the excess of its
funds over the amount necessary to meet its obligations and maintain solvency. Most
participating insurers are mutual insurance corporations which have no capital stock and
are owned by the policyholders, or reciprocal exchanges which are unincorporated associa-
tions organized to write insurance for members. Each member agrees to become liable for
its share of losses and expenses of all members and authorizes an attorney-in-fact to effect
its exchange of insurance with the other members. Some stock companies issue participating
policies.
Probably the National Association of Independent Insurers should also be placed in
the participating insurers' category since a majority of its members were participating
carriers. Patterson, "At the Crossroads," Best's Fire & Cas. News, April 1947, at 32; S. Rep.
No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961). Some of the other members of this association
belonged to rating bureaus and others regularly wrote at bureau rates. Also, its member-
ship either specialized in automobile insurance or wrote this line exclusively so one may
say that the association was not truly representative of the independent insurers. Patterson,
"At the Crossroads," Best's Fire & Cas. News, April 1947, at 32, 53-54.
147 Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, National Board of Fire Under-
writers, Surety Association of America, Insurance Executives Association, and Inland
Marine Underwriters Association. Of the eighteen company members represented on the
executive committee of the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, twelve were
affiliated with fire companies indicated in the SEUA case. This association was made up
predominantly of companies which established rates through bureaus. Id. at 50-51. The
National Board of Fire Underwriters is a trade association of stock insurance companies,
which in the 1800's was a protagonist in rate making combinations, but which by 1944
conducted only indirect functions in bureau rate making. See Hearings, pt. 3, 1617-83.
148 See Mertz at 162-63; 1946 Proceedings 102-36, 357-97; 1947 Proceedings 217, 410-
13, for a discussion of the events leading up to the drafting of the all-industry bills and the
matters considered in drafting the bills.
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model bills to the states-the Fire, Marine, 4 9 and Inland Marine
Rate Regulatory Bill and the Casualty-Surety Rate Regulatory Bill,
commonly referred to as the all-industry bills.'
The two bills are alike in their essential structure and may be
discussed as one, although references to specific provisions and quota-
tions are to the Fire, Marine, and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill.
These all-industry bills attempt to implement five basic principles
which also have been the primary sources of litigation in the last two
decades.
(1) All rates are determined in accordance with written schedules,
based on experience, which are filed with the state. Section 3 of the
bill provides:
(a) Rates shall be made in accordance with the following
provisions:
(3) Due consideration shall be given to past and pro-
spective loss experience within and outside this state, to the con-
flagration and catastrophe hazards, to a reasonable margin for
profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or unabsorbed
premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers to their policy
holders, members or subscribers, to past and prospective
expenses both countrywide and those specially applicable to
this state, and to all other relevant factors within and outside
this state ....
Section 4 provides:
(a) Every insurer shall file with the (commissioner) [a ma-jority of states use this title, or a variation with the word "insur-
ance;" four states use the title "superintendent of insurance"; and
five use "director of insurance"]' 5 ' . . . , every manual, mini-
mum, class rate, rating schedule or rating plan and every other
rating rule, and every modification of any of the foregoing which it
proposes to use. Every such filing shall state the proposed effective
date thereof, shall indicate the character and extent of the coverage
contemplated and shall be accompanied by the information upon
which the insurer supports the filing. A filing and supporting
information shall be open to public inspection after the filing
becomes effective.
(2) The services of every rating organization or advisory organiza-
149 The term "marine' erroneously implies that ocean marine insurance was covered
by the bill; it was not.
15o Reference will be frequently made to the provisions of the All-Industry Bills
(AIB). Unless the contrary is indicated, the reference is to the drafts of May 18, 1946,
found in 1946 Proceedings 397-422. See 1947 Proceedings 226-27, for certain minor
amendments.
151 Best's Insurance Reports-Fire and Casualty 1967 vi.
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tion are available to every insurance company. A rating organization ' 2
actually makes rates for its members; an advisory organizationr 3
makes recommendations to underwriters regarding rates. A rating
organization may be licensed by the state, providing it files a copy of
the organization's constitution and by-laws and a list of members with
the commissioner and satisfies him that the organization is "compe-
tent, trustworthy and otherwise qualified to act as a rating organiza-
tion .... ,1 Similarly every advisory organization is required to file
with the commissioner a copy of its constitution and by-laws, a list of
its members, and an agreement that the commissioner may inspect its
operations. 55 No insurer which makes its own filing, nor any rating
organization, is permitted to support its filings by statistics or to adopt
rate recommendations furnished to it by an advisory organization
which has not complied with the requirements of the bill.
(3) An insurer may file its own rates independently or adopt those
of a licensed rating organization." 6 Furthermore, a participating carrier
cannot be excluded from any rating organization which it desires to
join. Section 6(c) provides:
No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which
would be to prohibit or regulate the payment of dividends, savings
or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers
to their policyholders, members or subscribers.
The bills also allow insurers to deviate from the rates established
by a rate bureau while remaining a member, for section 7 provides:
Every member of or subscriber to a rating organization shall
adhere to the filing made on its behalf by such organization except
that any such insurer may make written application to the (com-
missioner) for permission to file a deviation from the class rates,
schedules, rating plans or rules respecting any kind of insurance,
or class of risk within a kind of insurance, or combination thereof.
Such application shall specify the basis for the modification and a
copy thereof shall also be sent simultaneously to such rating organi-
zation. The (commissioner) shall set a time and place for a hearing
at which the insurer and such rating organization may be heard
.... Each deviation permitted to be filed shall be effective for a
period of one year ....
The purpose of the one-year deviation is to prohibit so-called flash
152 AIB § 6.
1'3 AIM § 10.
154 AIB § 6(a).
155 AIB § 10(b).
156 AIB § 4.
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filings-favorable filings made on behalf of a single or a few insureds
and then withdrawn.'
(4) Rates may not be "excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory." '' s
(5) After the rate is filed with the insurance commissioner, the all-
industry bills provide (a) that no premium schedule shall be effective
until fifteen days after its filing;"z9 (b) that the commissioner may
extend this period of suspense for another fifteen days; 60 (c) that the
commissioner may, before this period of suspense expires, disapprove
any rate schedule if it is excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina-
tory, in which case it shall be ineffective;' 6" (d) that the commissioner
may, after a schedule has become effective and either in response to a
complaint or on his own motion, hold a hearing concerning the propriety
of such schedule, and may, after such hearing, disapprove the schedule,
either in whole or in part, so far as future transactions are concerned. 162
If the commissioner fails to disapprove a filing within the waiting period
or the extension, then the filing is deemed to meet the requirements of
the act.:' This provision is the so-called deemer clause: rates are
deemed approved unless affirmatively disapproved by the commis-
sioner.
C. Alternative Proposals
At least five proposals were made which differed in varying degrees
from the NAIC-AIC bills. None of these proposals sought to effect
as stringent a system of cooperative rate making as the all-industry
legislation.
First, the Department of Justice proposed that property and
casualty insurers pool their loss experience to establish uniform pure
premiums-the amount necessary to pay losses, including a sum suf-
ficient to maintain adequate reserves against conflagrations. 6 This
information would provide credible statistical data for predicting future
157 Hearings, pt. 2, 1257.
158 AIB § 3(a). For a discussion of these terms see F. Crane, Automobile Insurance
Rate Regulation 103-31 (1962) ; Klitzke, "Fire Insurance Rates and the Law," 1956 Ins.
LJ. 631, 645-46; Moser, "Operations of Independents under the Rate Regulatory Pattern,"
15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 523, 529-37 (1950).
159 AIB § 4(d). This waiting period is to afford the commissioner time to examine a
rate filing to determine whether it complies with the statutory standards.
160 Id.
161 I § 5(a).
162 AIB §§ 5(c), (d).
163 AIB § 4(d).
164 Brief for Appellant at 109, SEUA, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
loss probabilities without running afoul of the Sherman Act. Under
this system insurers could even use the same gross rates as long as they
did not agree to do so. Insurers could compete on such terms as agents'
commissions, advertising outlays, administrative salaries, and profit
margins. Attorney General Biddle pointed out that life insurers have
operated under such a system for years. 65 Critics of this pure premium
approach contended that it precluded flexibility and variations among
carriers concerning such matters as territorial classifications, risk clas-
sifications, and methods of allocating expenses whose uniform method
of computation was necessary to establish reliable statistical informa-
tion. This allegedly would result in serious operational defects, weaken
the solvency of many companies, encourage unfair dealing, and precip-
itate "unbridled rate competition and rate wars,"'66 although it is
difficult to understand how all these ills would flow from the plan.
Second, the so-called brokers plan1'" proposed that the all-industry
bills be the maximum control over rates that any state consider and
that the minimum control require that rates be filed before immediate
use. The state insurance commissioner could stop the use of rates
found to violate standards adopted by the state after an administrative
hearing. Each state would determine how much control along the
regulatory spectrum was necessary to protect the public. This plan was
designed to overcome several purported weaknesses of the all-industry
bills such as the strict regulation of rates through prior approval which
allegedly would produce uniform rates and favoritism toward direct
writing, participating carriers who could return greater dividends to
their policyholders since they paid no commissions to agents. 66 Some
critics questioned whether the broker's plan provided the quantum of
regulation necessary to invoke the McCarran Act's exemption from
the federal antitrust laws.169
Third, another plan with flexibility as its paramount aim suggested
a law providing that rates be adequate, reasonable, and not unfairly
discriminatory. Whether rates should be filed with the state was not
important. The state insurance commissioner would be authorized to
investigate rates on his own initiative to see if they met the three
165 Life insurance rates are fixed by the companies on the basis of mortality experi-
ence, interest assumptions, and expense assumptions, together with competition. No rating
bureaus or other industry agreements exist concerning rates. State reserve requirements
take care of solvency problems. All life insurers do not, however, use the same pure
premiums. Insurers which do not pay dividends use lower pure premiums than the others.
Also insurers may use one of several mortality tables.
166 Marryott, "W'hy Regulate Insurance?," J. Am. Ins., Nov. 1946, at 46, 48.
167 Dineen, "The AIC Bills and the Alternatives," J. Am. Ins., Nov. 1946, at 27, 30.
168 Sawyer, "Clearing The Record," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Jan. 1947, at 23.
169 Dineen, supra note 167, at 30.
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statutory standards and to issue cease and desist orders after an
administrative hearing. The unique feature of the proposal was that
any solvent carrier could receive approval from the insurance commis-
sioner to use any rate, or net rate if a participating company, allowed
for any other carrier. This would allow a company to meet immediately
a competitor's rates. The plan was said to leave rates open to full and
fair competition, permitting a company to change its rates as it pleased
so long as they were reasonable, adequate, and not unfairly discrimina-
tory.170 A bill incorporating this plan was introduced in the Rhode
Island legislature,171 but apparently was not enacted. Critics argued
that this plan would foster discrimination by allowing insurers to quote
varying rates to meet particular competitive situations and would
drive out small, independent companies which survive by reflecting
efficiencies of operation in their rates, but which would be injured by
large competitors selling below cost. 172
Fourth, the Risk Research Institute, Inc., an association of insur-
ance buyers for large firms, proposed that independent statistical
bureaus be established or authorized by the state to provide "complete,
interpretable data" to all interested persons.'73 Insurers could deviate
from rates established by such bureaus by filing an alternative plan
with the state insurance commissioner. Discriminatory rates would be
regulated under federal antitrust laws. The Risk Research Institute
contended that the all-industry bills would restrict and ultimately
destroy competition among insurers, would foster the inefficiency of
excessive government regulation, and would unlawfully allow insurers
to fix prices.
Fifth, under the so-called California plan, state regulation of rates
and rate-making activities was to be limited to an association of
insurers who agreed to fix and maintain prices, subject to the approval
of the insurance commissioner. Rating organizations were not to estab-
lish rates. Non-members were left unregulated except to the extent
necessary to protect the public interest. Rates were to be filed with
the state insurance commissioner for approval before their use.7 4
D. Appraisal of the Model Laws
The dominant bureau interests on the NAIC-AIC joint committee
prevailed in the drafting of the model laws. While the proposed legisla-
170 Stone, "Rate Regulatory Legislation," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Dec. 1946, at 29.
171 Dineen, supra note 167, at 29-30.
172 Marryott, supra note 166, at 46; Dineen, supra note 167, at 30.
173 "Buyers Offer Rate Bill," Best's Fire & Cas. News, March 1947, at 59; "Risk
Research Report," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Dec. 1946, at 85.
174 Dineen, supra note 167, at 29; Sawyer, supra note 168, at 23.
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tion ostensibly provided insurers with competitive opportunities, the
rate bureau interests later attempted to use the generality and flexibility
of the bills to entrench their position. The purported strengths of the
legislation in balancing the advantages of uniformity against the ad-
vantages of competition and in permitting independent operations were
more illusory than real. To achieve a competitive atmosphere and to
gain independence of action under the all-industry bills, carriers had to
litigate. The alternative proposals offered a freer industry framework,
but such freedom was resisted.
E. State Legislative Action
The great majority of the states adopted the all-industry bills
either verbatim or in substance." 5 Most variations of the all-industry
bills involve the deemer clause since the states had varying interpreta-
tions regarding how rates should be filed with the state to constitute
regulation under section 2(b) of the McCarran Act. Three states
adopted non-filing provisions for fire or casualty insurance, or both
lines, but allowed the insurance commissioner to request that the rates
be filed." 6 The California law specifically forbids agreements to adhere
to rates. The Montana casualty law requires rate filing only for bureau
rates. A number of jurisdictions adopted or retained laws permitting
filings to become effective immediately, subject to subsequent disap-
proval-so-called file-and-use laws. 77 In New Hampshire rates may
take effect immediately but with discretionary power in the commis-
sioner to suspend any filing for up to thirty days after receipt, without
a prior hearing.
Adoption of all-industry laws brought with it repeal of existing
mandatory bureau laws, uniform rate laws, and other anticompeti-
tive statutes in many, but not all, jurisdictions where they existed
at the time of the SEUA decision. Mandatory bureau or uniform
rate laws still remain in six states. Provisions which require the
state's express approval of rates prior to their use are also found in
these states. Other jurisdictions also retained laws, primarily for work-
men's compensation rates, which are more restrictive than the all-
industry laws insofar as competition and independence of action are
concerned.
175 See Mertz at 225-26 for citations to the statutes in each state. In some states the
present laws reflect amendments since their enactment in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
176 California (fire and casualty), Missouri (casualty), and Idaho (casualty).
177 Delaware, Distriet of Columbia (casualty), Maine, Massachusetts (except com-
pulsory automobile liability insurance), Ohio (casualty), and Wyoming.
178 Louisiana (fire), Mississippi (fire), North Carolina (fire and casualty), Virginia
(fire and casualty), Texas (fire and casualty), and the District of Columbia (fire).
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Although the focus of this analysis is on rate regulation, one should
note that following the McCarran Act the states drafted and adopted
all-ndustry type bills for other areas of insurance regulation. State
unfair trade practices acts were passed in fifty-two jurisdictions, in-
cluding the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. These acts prohibit
such practices as misrepresentation and false advertising of policy
contracts, defamation, boycott, coercion, intimidation, false finan-
cial statements, and rebates. 7 9 Twenty-two states and Puerto Rico
have "Little Clayton" type legislation which generally provides that
insurance companies may have interlocking directorates if competition
is not substantially lessened or a monopoly created. Several acts also
provide for acquisition of the capital stock of other insurers, subject
to similar limitations.380
The McCarran Act not only evoked state legislation in the areas of
primary vulnerability under the federal antitrust laws, but it also
triggered the development under NAIC and industry auspices of model
legislation concerning credit life insurance, unauthorized insurers, and
practices in the accident, health, and sickness lines of insurance.' 8 '
VII. MEANING OF "TO THE EXTENT . . . NOT REGULATED"
OF SECTION 2(b) OF THE McCARRAN ACT
The NAIC, the AIC, and the states were clearly preoccupied with
protecting concerted rate making practices of the property and casualty
insurance industry from the federal antitrust laws. It was assumed,
without any discussion, that state legislation fulfilled the requirement
of the proviso of section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act that the insurance
industry be "regulated by State law." "Law" was assumed to mean
"legislation." No one seemed concerned whether the states could
effectively implement the all-industry legislation. Although the states
had been charged with allowing their regulatory schemes to suffer from
atrophy,8 2 no state appears to have attempted to increase the budget
or staff of its insurance department or otherwise to strengthen its ad-
ministration to implement the all-industry legislation.
A. Legislative History
This myopic approach of the states is rather surprising in light of
the legislative history of the McCarran Act which indicates that state
'79 See Mertz at 170-71, 227-28.
180 Id. at 172-73, 235.
181 Id. at 173-78, 230-35.
182 E. Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States (1927). The
Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly charged state insurance
departments with impotent regulation. S. Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
legislation is not sufficient to preclude the application of the federal
antitrust laws. This legislative history rather clearly suggests that
"regulated" means active, effective administrative regulation.
For example, on signing the McCarran Act President Roosevelt
said:
After the moratorium period, the anti-trust laws . . . will be
applicable ... except to the extent that the States have assumed the
responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility ....
It is clear from the legislative history and the language of this
Act, that the Congress intended no grant of immunity for mo-
nopoly .... Congress did not intend to permit private rate fixing
* . * but was willing to permit the actual regulation of rates by
affirmative action of the States..
83
Attorney General Biddle also spoke for the administration:
The view we hold toward insurance is not unlike our policy
toward railroad rates, that the fixing of rates by private groups
... without active and definite state approval, is a clear contraven-
tion, not only of the [Sherman] act, but of the whole theory that
underlies the act, the theory that competition should be free unless
it is specifically regulated by the appropriate body.184
The proviso of section 2 (b) emerged from a conference consisting
of Senators McCarran, Ferguson, O'Mahoney, and Representatives
Sumners, Walter, and Hancock.'8 5 It represented a compromise be-
tween the Senate and House versions of the bill. 8 ' Since the House
accepted the conference report without debate,8 7 the only discussion
of the proviso occurred in the Senate. The following colloquy took
place on February 26:
Senator Ferguson: [I] nsofar as the State is concerned which
has specifically legislated on the subject, the three acts [Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission] shall not apply.
Senator O'Mahoney: I believe that the Senator from Michigan
went a little further than was his intention when he said that if
the States have legislated certain things will take place. The bill
says if the States have regulated.
Senator Barkley: I should like to ask, in this connection,
whether, where States attempt to occupy the field-but do it inade-
183 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1944-45 at 587
(Rosenman ed. 1950).
184 Quoted in Dineen, "The Rating Problem," 1946 Proceedings, A.BA. Sec. of Ins.
L. 104, 105.
185 91 Cong. Rec. 1208, 1274, 1357 (1945).
186 Id. at 1357, 1396, 1481-82.
187 Id. at 1396.
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quately-by going through the form of legislation so as to deprive
the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the other acts of their
jurisdiction, it is the Senator's interpretation of the conference report
that in a case of that kind, where the legislature fails adequately
even to deal with the field it attempts to cover, these acts still
would apply? 88
Senator McCarran: That is my interpretation.lssa
Senator Pepper of Florida then objected to the conference report
bill because it "Practically destroys the effect of the Supreme Court
decision, and I am against that." Senator McCarran replied: "The
Senator is correct regarding the 3-year moratorium, but beyond that
he is in error."
Subsequently Senator McCarran wrote: "[T]he intent of the Act
was not to accomplish any particular degree of stringency of regula-
tion, but to keep regulation at the State level, and forestall Federal
regulation .... " On the other hand, he contemplated that the legisla-
tion must meet certain minimum standards to satisfy the proviso. Once
these minimum requirements were met, the adequacy of state regulation
was a matter of legislative, not judicial, concern." 9
The next day Senator Pepper contended that the conference bill
enabled the states to evade the federal antitrust laws by mere legisla-
tion.'90 Also Senators Ferguson, Murdock, and O'Mahoney seemed to
be of the opinion that if the states legislated, Congress should decide
whether state regulation was such that the proviso of the McCarran
Act shielded the particular activities.' 91
The statements of the Senators are ambiguous and the reported
dialogue jumbled. The statements reflect the lack of precision in
language inherent in extemporaneous speaking and perhaps the lack of
careful thinking. Whether the Senators were talking about the ade..
quacy of the scope of legislation, or about the adequacy of enforcement
of the legislation, is not clear. Nevertheless, the legislative history of
the McCarran Act rather strongly indicates that mere legislation,
without effective implementation, does not preclude the application of
the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 2
188 See also Senator Barkley's statement, id. at 1488.
188a Supra, note 185 at 1443-44.
189 Letter to Yale Law Journal, quoted in Note, "State Supervision over Insurance
Rate-Making Combinations under the McCarran Act," 60 Yale LJ. 160, 163 n.11 (1951).
See also McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance," 34 A.BAJ. 539, 542 (1948); McCar-
ran, "Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 Notre Dame Law. 299, 306 (1948).
190 91 Cong. Rec. 1444 (1945).
191 Id. at 1477-83.
192 Contra, Morris, "Meaning of Term 'Regulated by State Law' in Public Law 15,"
1949 Proceedings, A.B.A. Sec. of Ins. L. 213, 221-22. Morris argues that the term
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B. Judicial Interpretations
The courts have not followed the legislative intent regarding the
meaning of the words "regulated by State law." In considering the
meaning of these words, the courts have viewed the phrase in the
context of two different issues. The first issue is whether, by enacting
statutes covering certain insurance activities which would otherwise be
subject to federal law, the states have in fact "regulated" such activi-
ties, or whether effective administration of such statutes is a prerequi-
site to regulation. The decisions indicate that the mere existence of
state legislation is sufficient.
North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exck.'193
was the first reported decision involving the meaning of "regulated."
The court, however, did not attempt to probe the definition of the word.
In affirming a summary judgment for the defendant against the allega-
tion of a combination in restraint of trade,'94 no inquiry was made
beyond the fact that the state had a statute which authorized the
licensing of rating bureaus. It was simply assumed that the state had
regulated whenever it legislated.'95
In a similar approach, the mere existence of a general state anti-
trust statute has been held sufficient to constitute regulation within
the meaning of the McCarran Act's section 2(b) proviso. 9 ' The
Department of Justice, however, has expressed the opinion that a state
antitrust law does not suffice as regulation under section 2(b),"'
while the FTC has said that such a law is tantamount to regulation. 9 '
Although not involving rate regulation, several decisions concern-
ing activities of mail order. accident and health companies discuss
whether "regulated" means merely legislation or active, effective ad-
ministration of such legislation.
"regulated" forecloses an inquiry into the effectiveness of state enforcement. He reasons
that since Congress used the term in the general sense, it did not mean for federal regula-
tion to overlap where a state acted to occupy the area and did not intend to embarrass
state administration.
198 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950). Accord, Miley v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd, per curiam, 242 F.2d 758
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
194 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
195 But see Note, "State Supervision over Insurance Rate-Making Combinations
under the McCarran Act," 60 Yale L.J. 160 (1951).
196 California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175
F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Calif. 1959); Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers
Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 278-80 (D. Mont. 1958).
197 Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 2, 939-40.
19s Id. at 953-55.
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In two cases 9 ' the courts rejected the FTC's contention that the
states were not actively regulating the challenged activities within the
meaning of section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act. Both courts considered
state regulation synonymous with state legislation."' When the Su-
preme Court considered these cases on certiorari,20 ' it also rejected
the FTC's argument that the states had not regulated within the mean-
ing of the section 2 (b) proviso. The Court stated:
Petitioner also argues . . . that . . .exercise of Commission
authority in these cases should be upheld because the States have
not 'regulated' within the meaning of the Section 2 (b) proviso. This
argument is not persuasive in the instant cases. Each State in ques-
tion has enacted prohibitory legislation which proscribes unfair
insurance advertising and authorizes enforcement through a scheme
of administrative supervision. Petitioner does not argue that the
statutory provisions here under review were mere pretense. Rather,
it urges that a general prohibition designed to guarantee certain
standards of conduct is too 'inchoate' to be 'regulation' until that
prohibition has been crystalized into 'administrative elaboration of
these standards and application in individual cases.' However,
assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson Act
between 'legislation' and 'regulation,' nothing in the language of that
Act or its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by
petitioner. So far as we can determine from the records and the
arguments in these cases, the proviso of Section 2(b) has been
satisfied.202
One may construe the Court's language two different ways: Did
the Court mean "satisfied" because the statutes were not a pretense
since they authorized enforcement through a scheme of administrative
supervision, or because there was in fact supervision? It is not clear
whether the Court relied on the existence of state regulatory legislation,
or on the effectiveness of such regulation, as the controlling factor. In
a subsequent case a district court cited the National Cas. Co. decision
for the proposition that "a state regulates the business of insurance...
when a State statute generally proscribes or permits or authorizes cer-
tain conduct on the part of the insurance companies.)2 0 3
A similar ambiguity is found in the decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
199 American Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357
U.S. 560 (1958); National Cas. Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S.
560 (1958).
200 243 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1957) ; 245 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1957).
201 FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
202 Id. at 564-65.
203 California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175
F. Supp. 857, 860 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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Lanier.' 4 This case represents the only major attack upon any state
rating law since the passage of the McCarran Act. In the Allstate Ins.
Co. case the court was asked to nullify a North Carolina statute which
compelled all authorized automobile liability insurers to become mem-
bers of a rating bureau from which there could be no deviation in rates
except through charging rates higher than the minimum set by the
bureau. The basis of the challenge to the North Carolina statute was
that it violated section 3(b) of the McCarran Act, since it allegedly
amounted to coercion or intimidation of private insurance companies
and restrained competition under the Sherman Act, which has con-
tinning application to the insurance business in the absence of state
regulation.
In refusing to interfere with the state legislature's discretion to
forbid forms of competition which it deemed undesirable, the district
court held that a state may legislatively validate actions and procedures
which, if conducted on a voluntary basis without state regulation, might
violate the Sherman Act. The bar against acts of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation imposed by the Sherman Act and made applicable to the
business of insurance under the McCarran Act was held inapplicable
to the legislative action taken by the state in furthering its regulatory
scheme. In so holding the court relied upon the proviso of section 2 (b)
of the McCarran Act. The reasoning employed was that a scale of op-
eration exists in which to legislate; the scale beginning at its maximum
end, with the state exercising full control over the insurance industry by
excluding all private insurers and the state becoming the only insurer.
As the state diminishes its control, a certain point is reached on the
scale where a vacuum is created which the federal government must
fill. The McCarran Act was designed to show the states where this
point is on the theoretical scale.2 °5
The indicia of control sufficient to negate private coercion and
intimidation and to constitute adequate state control were (1) the
degree of control the commissioner of insurance has over the North
Carolina rate bureau; (2) the right of dissatisfied members to appeal
to the commissioner and to receive permission to deviate from the
bureau's filing by an upward deviation; (3) the right of dissatisfied
members to protest to the commissioner concerning any determination
made by the rate bureau, which is required to hold a hearing before
revising rates; and (4) the right of members to compete freely in such
204 242 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.C. 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966). For a discussion of the case see Note, "Antitrust-Insurance-Com-
pulsory Rating Bureaus," 45 N.C.L. Rev. 481 (1967).
205 242 F. Supp. 73, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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nonprohibited ways as paying dividends and giving increased service.
Because the court focused on the statutory indicia of control, one
may argue that it considered this sufficient regulation under the Mc-
Carran Act. There was no discussion of the actual control or activities
of the state under its statutes. On the other hand, in affirming the
district court's decision, the court of appeals emphasized that the
rating bureau was established and administered "under the active
supervision of the State."2 6 In focusing on the alleged "active" state
regulation, the court of appeals relied upon the exemption from the
Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, rather than on section 2 (b) of
the McCarran Act. But even though the court of appeals referred to
the "active supervision of the State," it focused only on the extent of
the powers of the state, and in particular those of the insurance com-
missioner. The more difficult question, alluded to by the FTC in the
National Cas. Co. case, is whether the regulation is in fact vigorous,
rather than just inchoate. The court of appeals in the Allstate Ins. Co.
case failed to consider this point. Although the North Carolina commis-
sioner may have extensive statutory powers, he may act as a rubber
stamp or may merely perform the ritual of regulation without doing
anything else.
These decisions, indicating that state legislation constitutes regu-
lation within the meaning of the section 2 (b) proviso of the McCarran
Act, seem erroneous. Such a rationale offers an easy formula for the
solution of jurisdictional conflicts: If a state statute covers the practice
involved, the state's jurisdiction is deemed exclusive. From a public
policy viewpoint, effective administration of such legislation should be
a prerequisite to state regulation. Since state regulatory machinery lags
behind its statutory framework in nearly every state,207 a regulatory
vacuum is created, not effectively reached by the states and into which
the federal government cannot enter. Since the property and casualty
insurance industry constitutes a substantial segment of the national
economy and is imbued with the public interest, it should not be
allowed to operate outside both state and federal control.
The precedents are somewhat ambiguous concerning whether "reg-
206 361 F.2d 870, 871, 872 (4th Cir. 1966). The United States filed a memorandum in
the district court urging invalidation of the North Carolina program on the ground that
it permitted the unsupervised establishment of minimum premiums by private companies,
that is, that the state had failed to come up to the extent of regulation required by the
McCarran Act. 242 F. Supp. 73, 83 (E.D. N.C. 1965). Following the district court's de-
cision, the United States did not join in the appeal. 361 F.2d 870, 872 n.2 (4th Cir. 1966).
207 See S. Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), regarding the problems of in-
adequate staffs and budgets, high personnel turnovers, the low level of expertise, and the
like, in state insurance departments.
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ulated" means the enactment of legislation providing for a regulatory
scheme or the active, effective implementation of such a scheme. Simi-
larly, the relatively few decisions concerning the second issue involving
the meaning of the words "regulated by State law"--the jurisdictional
boundaries of a state's regulation over interstate insurance activities-
are equally ambiguous in defining the outer limits of a state's jurisdic-
tion. Although the major case involves the regulation of an accident
and health mail order insurer, 10 and not rate regulation, the precedent
is still relevant.
In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n 0 9 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the application of the Federal Trade Commission Act to an in-
surance company which, though licensed in only two states, conducted
a mail order business throughout the country. This issue was not con-
sidered by the Court in the National Cas. Co. case since only an
insubstantial amount of mail advertising was involved. The insurer
engaged in a strictly mail order business, originating from its Nebraska
home office. It sent letters into all states, but was licensed only in its
home state of Nebraska and Virginia. At the time the FTC proceeding
was commenced, the Unfair Practices Act of Nebraska did not ex-
pressly cover false advertising practices outside the state, but the
Nebraska law was amended while the proceeding was pending.
The FTC argued that the states into which advertising material
was mailed were powerless to deal with the problem effectively. Reject-
ing this contention, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted
that all the transactions were consummated in Omaha. The practices
in question were held to be regulated by Nebraska law, and were thus
shielded from the regulatory powers of the Commission.21°
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that Nebraska could not be
considered to regulate the practices of the insurer to preclude the
possible application of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Court
reasoned that a state cannot regulate the practices of an insurance
business affecting residents of other states.2 ' But the Court did not
rule whether the insurer's advertising practices were regulated by the
208 For an exhaustive analysis of the constitutional authority of the states to regu-
late and tax unauthorized mail order insurers, particularly accident and health companies,
and of the methods by which the states can make effective their regulation, see Hanson
& Obenberger, "Mail Order Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the States to Regulate
the Insurance Business," 50 Marq. L. Rev. 175 (1966).
209 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
210 The dissent emphasized: "I do not believe ... that the after-the-fact amendment
... is the kind of regulation by state law Congress had in mind." 262 F.2d 241, 245 (8th
Cir. 1959).
211 FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1960).
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states in which it conducted its mail order business, because the court
of appeals "gave no consideration to the effect of 'regulation' by any
state other than Nebraska. 212 Arguably, as the dissent points out,213
the majority opinion emphasizes the effectiveness of such regulation,
rather than the existence of a statutory scheme, since the majority
reserved, "for what they are worth,12 14 the questions that would arise
were a state outside Travelers Health's home state to legislate against
an out-of-state insurer mailing advertising into its jurisdiction.
Upon remand,213 the court of appeals considered this issue. While
recognizing that any state could subject the company to its jurisdiction,
consistent with due process, for purposes of a cease and desist order, it
felt that the state would still lack "the ultimate compulsiveness 2 16 to
regulate within the meaning of section 2(b) of the McCarran Act.
Since the case did not go back to the Supreme Court, one does not
know whether the Court would agree with the interpretation of the
court of appeals.
Another aspect of this problem is whether the mere licensing of
national rate bureaus or advisory organizations, which are based in a
foreign jurisdiction but which in effect set rates in other jurisdictions,
gives the state enough "ultimate compulsiveness" to satisfy the stan-
dard expressed by the Supreme Court in Travelers Health Ass'n. Al-
though one may argue that the licensing of a bureau or advisory
organization and the mere presence of agents is not enough,217 it would
seem that the necessary quantum of compulsiveness for state regulation
exists. The critical factor in Travelers Health Ass'n was whether there
existed the "ultimate compulsiveness" of state regulation over an
insurer's advertising in the state where the advertising had its impact.
Such "ultimate compulsiveness" clearly exists with respect to activities
of an insurer which is licensed by the state. The licensing submits the
insurer to the full measure of the state's regulation regardless of
whether the advertising originated outside the state and is sent into
the state for distribution by local agents or is mailed in the state
directly to the public. Neither the source of the advertising nor its
method of dissemination in any way should diminish the regulatory
power of the licensing state.
In the only case involving rate regulation having interstate impli-
212 Id. at 299 n.4.
213 Id. at 309.
214 Id. at 299 n.4.
215 Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
216 Id. at 824.
217 Palmer, "Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction over Insurance Advertising,"
1964 Ins. LJ. 69.
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cations, the court followed the Travelers Health Ass'n decision in
denying motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum.21 The motions were
made by the Associated Aviation Underwriters (AAU) and the Avia-
tion Insurance Rating Bureau (AIRB). AAU is an association of
insurance companies which, in effect, conducts the business of member
insurers insofar as aviation risks are concerned. The association handles
various types of coverage, including aircraft hull insurance, aircraft
personal injury and death insurance, property liability insurance, per-
sonal accident insurance, and general liability insurance-which con-
sists of airport liability, airline ground, and products liability insurance.
The vast majority of the contracts of insurance entered into by AAU
arise in New York. AIRB is a rating organization formed under the
laws of New York. Membership is open to any capital stock insurer
authorized to write insurance, for which AIRB prescribes rates, in-
cluding aircraft hull insurance, passenger liability insurance, aircraft
property damage liability insurance, and employers' aviation indem-
nity insurance. The constituency of both AAU and AIRB is apparently
the same. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was
investigating alleged price fixing agreements among members of both
groups. The movants asserted that section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act
precluded the issuance of the subpoenas since the practices being
investigated were regulated by their domiciliary state, New York. Only
five states, California, Montana, New Jersey, New York, and North
Carolina, had statutes regulating aircraft hull and casualty or liability
insurance. In addition, AIRB admitted that it was only licensed in
these five states since the other forty-five states exempted aviation
insurance from their rate regulatory statutes. New York's regulation
was found not to be effective to oust the Antitrust Division of its
jurisdiction.219
The opinion follows the language of the Supreme Court in Trav-
elers Health Ass'n that "the state regulation which Congress provided
should operate to displace this federal law [the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act] means regulation by the State in which the deception is
practiced and has its impact. 220 While holding that the activities of
218 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Aviation Ins. Indus., 183 F. Supp. 374 (SD.
N.Y. 1960).
219 See also United States v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 65 Civ. No. 2400,
S.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 1965, and United States v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.,
65 Civ. No. 2401, S.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 1965, which are actions against the nation's
two largest aviation underwriting pools. The complaints allege that the underwriting pools
violate -the Sherman Act.




AAU and AIRB are practiced and have their impact in all states,
unfortunately the court failed to set forth its analysis of the necessary
elements to support its holding. The conclusion was that those states
which exempt various aspects of aviation insurance from their statutes
fail to regulate within the meaning of the McCarran Act. Since the vast
majority of states do not have statutes governing aviation insurance,
no consideration was given to whether mere legislation constitutes
regulation. The court added that in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Travelers Health Ass'n and the failure of many states to regu-
late at all, the issue of whether activities which are essentially
concerned with interstate or foreign commerce can be the subject of
state control, and thus exempt from federal control, was not before the
court. Thus the decision does not define the extent that the New York
statutes regulate the aviation insurance industry.
In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 12 the court held
that Chicago Title's acquisition of substantially all the stock of Kansas
City Title was not regulated by state law under the McCarran Act.
Neither Illinois, where Chicago Title had its principal office and the
only state where it was licensed to do business, nor Missouri, the home
state of Kansas City Title, had antitrust statutes comparable to
section 7 of the Clayton Act,12 which applied to the merger. The
Illinois antitrust statute had been construed not to apply to combina-
tions with parties outside the state nor to the business of insurance.
Although Missouri had a comprehensive antitrust law, which em-
powered the state to issue an injunction to liquidate an insurer, the
statute applied only to corporations licensed to do business in the state.
Similarly, with regard to those states other than Missouri and Illinois
in which the merger had an effect and which had statutes pertaining to
stock acquisitions, there could be no enforcement of such statutes since
Chicago Title was not licensed to do business in those states. Thus,
although a state may have the power to proscribe certain activities of
out-of-state insurers, it must also have the means to implement such
power for there to be regulation under the McCarran Act. Lamentably,
the decision does not sharply delineate the boundaries of a state's
power and the means of implementing that power over an insurer's
221 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965). The case was subsequently disposed of by a
consent decree entered May 23, 1966. 1966 CCHI Trade Cases para. 71,745 (N.D. Ill.).
222 Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides, in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital ... where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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multistate activities. Instead, general support for the court's conclu-
sion came from the Congressional debates pertaining to the McCarran
Act, the Supreme Court's opinion in the Travelers Health Ass'n deci-
sion, and the Eighth Circuit's opinion, upon remand, in Travelers
Health Ass'n.
Recently the scope of state regulation may have been significantly
widened. In Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase2 3 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the state's statute asserting the state's jurisdic-
tion to regulate the mail order solicitation of business by unauthorized
insurers among Wisconsin residents.224 However, the existence of a
parallel similar to restraints of trade is less certain, that is, between
regulatory jurisdiction assumed by the states and the degree of control
constituting regulation necessary under section 2 (b) of the McCarran
Act to displace the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission
Acts. The major obstacle is the ability of the state in which the impact
of the practices of an out-of-state insurer, rate bureau, or rate advisory
organization occurs to enforce meaningfully orders which would flow
from the exercise of its assumed jurisdiction when the entity is "pres-
ent" in the state in the sense that such jurisdiction constitutionally may
be acquired. Since the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed
the appeal in the Minister Life & Cas. Union case, one does not know
whether the Court agrees with the reasoning of the court of appeals
upon remand in the Travelers Health Ass'n case, where it was held
that attempted regulation of such out-of-state parties by the state
where the impact occurs lacks the "ultimate compulsiveness" needed
to achieve state regulation within the meaning of section 2 (b).
VIII. AFTERMATH OF THE ALL-INDUSTRY RATING BILLs
From this general description of the all-industry pattern of regu-
lation, it would seem that opportunities for price competition had been
adequately assured through provisions allowing for independent rate
filings, permitting deviations from bureau rates, making affiliation with
a rating bureau voluntary, requiring rating bureaus to permit all autho-
rized insurers to subscribe to their services, requiring all material data
on rates to be matters of public record, and granting the insurance
commissioners continuing supervision over internal affairs of rating
bureaus at the request of members or subscribers who are not satisfied
with the bureau's action. Furthermore, the purpose clauses of the bills
223 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205 (1966).
224 For an extensive discussion of Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, see Hanson
& Obenberger, "Mail Order Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the States to Regulate
the Insurance Business," 50 Marq. L. Rev. 175 (1966).
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recognize the role of reasonable price competition and declare that the
bills should be liberally construed. A meaningful evaluation of these
opportunities for price competition is possible, however, only after
consideration of the problems encountered by individual insurers in
their efforts to compete on a price basis.
Some observers foresaw the problems posed by the all-industry
legislation. They charged that the all-industry laws were not in the
public interest because (1) they imposed burdensome filing require-
ments which would stifle price competition and increase the expense of
independent insurers in making the various filings required by the bills;
(2) they imposed cumbersome deviation procedures upon rate bureau
members which deviations could be shelved by a bureau's lengthy
internal procedure and objections before a commissioner; (3) they
would tend to increase the difficulties poor risks would have in obtain-
ing coverage by imposing uniform rates made for the average or below
average risk; (4) they would tend to cause uniform insurance coverage
with a consequent lessening of the scope for the development of new
coverages; and (5) they would increase the cost of doing business for
all insurers.225
A. State Decisions Dealing with Competitione6
The cases dealing with the accommodation under the rating laws
of the philosophies of competitive rate making versus cooperative rate
making reveal the problems inherent in the all-industry bills. The liti-
gation also exemplifies the observation that "traditional habits of
thought which had preserved for many years had encrusted" the fire
insurance industry "with attitudes stifling progress and hostile to new
ideas. 22
7
The focus of this analysis is primarily upon judge-made law, only
because such law is more accessible than administrative law. Adminis-
trative practice and procedure probably are of greater significance than
judicial decisions in rate regulation, for (1) courts rarely overturn the
rulings of an insurance commissioner; (2) the commissioner is often
able to enforce a ruling that could be upset by litigation; (3) some
225 Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'-All Industry Laws," 15 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 606 (1950). See also Patterson, "At the Crossroads," Best's Fire & Cas.
News, April 1947, at 32.
226 A rather disjointed discussion of post all-industry cases is found in Mertz
supra note 123. This heading and the subheadings under it, as well as portions of the
discussion, are taken from the Mertz article.
227 McHugh, "Rate Regulation Revisited: The Point of View of a Federal Official,"
in Insurance and Government 385, 390 (Center & Heins eds. 1962). See also Hearings,
supra note 36, pt. 2, 1132-33, 1174, 1246.
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states give the commissioner blanket power to make regulations to
carry out the spirit of the insurance law, while others give him much
more limited, but still extensive, power; and (4) the commissioner may
accomplish much through moral suasion.2 s1 Still judge-made law is
important.
1. Resistance to Deviations
During the decade beginning in 1947, the utility of deviation
filing as a vehicle for strenuous competitive action was vigorously
attacked. Before the commissioner could approve the deviation filing
under the all-industry bills, he had to notify the rating bureau, which
had the right to be heard in opposition to the deviation. Some bureaus
had a policy of challenging all deviation applications.1 9 The records of
the 1959 hearings of the Senate's Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly reflect the experiences of at least fifteen companies, each of
which had been opposed repeatedly in protracted hearings and litigation
in various states.3 In addition, since a deviation filing was operative
for only one year, its effectiveness as a competitive measure was un-
certain because the rating bureau, which had the right to request
annual hearings, was often able to prevent a company from keep-
ing its deviation in continuous effect. The necessity of justifying a
deviation filing each year imposed a financial burden on an applicant
which few companies could bear.
An example of the frustrations encountered by carriers which
choose to deviate from the rates of an industry group is illustrated in
a case2 ' which arose under an all-industry type law and involved the
Insurance Company of North America (INA), a large independent
carrier. Each year from 1947 to 1950 INA and the Philadelphia Fire
and Marine Insurance Company applied for permission to deviate from
fire insurance rates filed by the Cook County Inspection Bureau. The
bureau waived hearings and the Illinois director of insurance approved
the deviations. But when the inspection bureau reduced its rates in
September 1951, it challenged the director's order allowing deviations
from such rates. The bureau unsuccessfully sought to overturn the
director's decision in the local circuit court and the Illinois Appellate
Court. Although the deviation was allowed, INA and the Philadelphia
Fire and Marine Insurance Company were the victims of harassing
228 E. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 12-16 (2d ed. 1957).
229 Hearings, pt. 2, 1164.
230 Hearings, pt. 2, 1121-75, 1291-369; pt. 4, 2134-73. See also Comment, 58 Mich.
L. Rev. 730 (1960).
231 Cook County Inspection Bureau v. Day, 359 fI1. 459, 110 N.E.2d 874 (1953).
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litigation because in March 1953 the appellate court dismissed the ap-
peal, pointing out that the question was moot since the director's order
approving the deviation had expired in September 1952 under the
provision of the all-industry bill which makes deviations effective for
only one year.
Many other instances have occurred where the converse problem
has arisen, that is, where deviations or renewals of deviations have been
denied. But appeals have not been taken principally because of the
short-lived value of a court decision upholding a particular deviation.2 32
In spite of the resistance to deviations by rate bureaus, the number
of deviations increased significantly2" and with this increase came
increasing judicial support for various forms of the practice. In Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.23 4 the court overturned an
insurance department ruling that the company could not proceed by
deviation in seeking approval of an optional one hundred dollar wind-
storm deductible endorsement at a twenty-five percent premium re-
duction; the bureau only provided for a fifty dollar deduction. There
is a difference between the language of the fire and casualty deviation
sections of the all-industry legislation. Liberty Mutual was acting
under the broader language of the fire deviation provision which does
not require a uniform deviation, as contrasted with the stricter casualty
section which permits only "a uniform percentage decrease or increase
to be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system." The
argument was rejected that the company had failed to exercise its statu-
tory right of appeal to the state insurance commissioner from the action
of a rating organization's approving or rejecting any proposed change
to the organization's filing. Liberty Mutual could seek a deviation for
itself by making a written application to the commissioner.
One important administrative ruling in this area was that of the
New York Insurance Department in July 1959. In this proceeding23 5
the superintendent of insurance granted a fifteen percent fire and ex-
tended coverage deviation by Allstate for commercial fire insurance,
based upon a fifteen percent prospective saving in expenses and a
prospective loss ratio approximating the average of all companies. The
232 See McCullough, "Insurance Rates in the Courts" (pts. 1-2), 1961 Ins. L.J.
381, 475.
233 Dirlam & Stelzer, "The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of
Regulated Competition," 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 199, 206 (1958) ; Hearings, pt. 7, 4146-54.
234 340 Mass. 413, 164 N.E.2d 908 (1960).
235 In the Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. Application for a Uniform Deviation of 15%
from Fire and Extended Coverage Rates of the NYFIRO for Classes Other than Dwellings
or Contents, Homeowner's Policies and Other Excluded Classes. See Mertz at 209.
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New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization (NYFIRO) argued
that this was illegal in that a deviation cannot be based on prospective
expense savings.2 6 The ruling offers encouragement to insurers to
enter new areas of underwriting while not being saddled with a bureau's
rates. If the insurer can demonstrate prospective economies, the com-
missioner may support the insurer's optimism.
2. Independent Filings and Partial Subscribership
Partly because of procedural obstacles and pitfalls as well as
limitations on the kinds of variations and innovations possible under
the deviation provisions, the idea of resigning from the bureaus, where
possible, and making independent filings, became more attractive to
competitive-minded companies. As INA reported at the end of 1954,
it came to the conclusion in 1953 that it had to become independent of
rating organizations with respect to the more sought-after classes of
business. Its purpose was to deal more effectively with competitive
abuses which were not in the public interest. A direct result of its action
was a stronger position for its agents and INA through lower costs
and improved policy forms and methods. In 1954, INA reported that
its independent rates for fire insurance on dwellings became effective
in twenty-eight states and in five of them a simplified dwelling policy
and rating plan was introduced with savings to policy holders of about
ten percent in premiums.237 Efforts by INA and other major insurers
to act independently produced a collision with the rate bureaus over
conflicting interpretations of the all-industry laws. The decisions that
resulted constitute important benchmarks in the post-McCarran Act
era.
The first test-case occurred in New York where INA resigned its
subscribership from the NYFIRO for most dwelling classes, made
independent filings, and obtained approval for such rates, while re-
maining a subscriber for commercial insurance and for certain dwelling
classes.23 The New York rating laws, which are substantially similar
to the all-industry type, permitted subscribership to a fire rating bureau
for any kind of insurance, subdivision, or class of risk written by fire
insurers. NYFIRO petitioned the New York insurance department to
withdraw its approval of INA's filings on the grounds that INA could
236 For a list of citations involving NYFIRO's opposition to INA's and Allstate's
competitive moves in New York State, see Epes, "Rate Regulation Revisited: The Views
of W. Perry Epes," in Insurance and Government 338, 349 n.50 (Center & Heins eds.
1962).
237 Insurance Company of North America, 163rd Annual Report, at 10 (1954).
238 See Hearings, pt. 2, 1167-75; pt. 4, 2020-22, 2028.
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not file independently for some fire classes and subscribe to NYFIRO
for others and that INA had violated NYFIRO's property rights by
"appropriating" and using bureau material in INA's dwelling filings.
The insurance department summarily rejected both arguments and
sustained the filing and the right of partial subscribership.23 9
In 1955, the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, after considering but
deciding against the complete exclusion of INA, adopted and filed
with several state insurance departments a rule which would have
destroyed the right of partial subscription under the all-industry type
laws. The effect of the rule was that companies desiring to file indepen-
dently in class-rated fields would be able to do so only by being
deprived of bureau services in the schedule-rated fields. The class-rated
fields are where a common premium is fixed for a group of insureds
having approximately the same expected losses and expenses. The
schedule-rated fields are a modification of class rating on the basis of
a comparison between some specified characteristics of a standard
insured and the corresponding characteristics of the insured who is
being rated. The companies valued the latter services and wished to
continue to subscribe to them. INA and the Fire Insurance Exchange
of Los Angeles attacked the rule in several states. Ultimately, in 1958,
the rule was held invalid by the Supreme Court of Arizona..240
When the independently filed fire dwelling rates of INA came
under attack in New York, the superintendent again rejected the
position of the rate bureau and commented:
It seems to me that in the case of an independent filing or a
deviation filing, expense savings from whatever legitimate source or
by whatever legitimate method may be passed on to the public in
the form of lower rates. NYFIRO incorrectly states that 'the pur-
pose of the 1948 amendments to the rating law was primarily to
preserve the status of the Rating Bureaus.' Section 180 of the Insur-
ance Law provides at the very beginning that the main purpose is
'to promote the public welfare'; and secondarily and in aid of such
purpose to provide cooperative action. There is nothing in the Law
which says that the rating bureaus shall be paramount. To hold
otherwise would not be in the public interest. As a matter of fact,
competition in the public interest is encouraged. What is meant by
competition is that it shall be clean, open and reasonable. There is
no mischief in that kind of competition. 41
239 In the Matter of the Independent Fire Filings of the Ins. Co. of N. Am. for
Dwelling Classes 009, 019, 029, and 011, N.Y. Ins. Dept., Sept. 14, 1954, aff'd, without
opinion sub. nom. Cullen v. Bollinger, 136 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1954),
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 803 (1955).
240 Pacific Fire Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 83 Ariz., 369, 321 P.2d
1030 (1958).
241 Quoted in Epes, "Rate Regulation Revisited: The Views of W. Perry Epes," in
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The decisions in New York and Arizona, upholding independent
filings and partial subscribership, have significance not only in terms
of the issues specifically resolved, but also in their treatment of the
role and function of the rating organization mechanism. In substance
the bureau counsel in those cases urged that the primary purpose of
the rating law provisions adopted after the McCarran Act was to
preserve the "status" of the bureaus, that the uniform pattern of rates
and coverages set by the bureau must remain paramount, and that
competition should be permitted only to the extent that it does not
materially weaken bureau status or disrupt bureau patterns. For
example, the bureau's brief in Pacific Fire Rating Bureau depicted
rating organizations as quasi-government agencies needed to assist
the commissioner in administering the law. It urged that bureau rules,
like those of an administrative agency, carry a strong presumption of
validity, which the commissioner can overcome only by an affirmative
showing that the rules are "clearly illegal, or plainly and palpably
inconsistent with law. ' 242 These arguments were not persuasive to the
Arizona Supreme Court. The qualified antitrust exemption granted
insurance rating organizations the privilege to make rates coopera-
tively; "partial subscribership and deviation ... are provided so that
competitive rates may inure to the benefit of the public."243 The bureau
rule restricting subscribership was held invalid and could not lawfully
be approved by the insurance commissioner because it "obviously
precludes freedom of rate competition that results from partial sub-
scribership.1'24 4
In Smith v. Wilker 45 NYFIRO argued that the concept of inde-
pendent filings under the all-industry legislation presupposes a car-
rier's terminating its subscribership to a rate bureau for all kinds of
insurance and classes of risks embraced in the coverage sought to be
filed. The argument was rejected, and the court upheld the determina-
tion of the New York superintendent of insurance that a carrier which
independently files a broad multiple peril policy may still subscribe to a
rating organization for its fire and extended coverage rates. The court
pointed out that the fundamental legislative purpose of the all-industry
bills was to promote the public welfare without prohibiting or dis-
couraging reasonable competition. The extensive litigation which the
Insurance and Government 338, 358 (Center & Heins eds. 1962), from In the Matter of
the Independent Rate Filings for Dwelling Classes by the N. Am. Cos., confirmed in
Cullen v. Holz, 184 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct., App. Div.).
242 Quoted in Mertz at 215.
243 83 Ariz. 369, 375, 321 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1958).
244 Id. at 375, 321 P.2d at 1034.




rate bureaus have engaged in for the last two decades suggests that
these organizations seek to prostitute the original purpose of the all-
industry bills at the expense of competition and independent action.
In a decision by the Washington Supreme Court24 it was held
an insurer may affiliate with a rate bureau to utilize the bureau's
research product while making independent rate filings with the state
insurance commissioner. This appears to be the ideal function of a
rating organization, that is, to gather, organize, and analyze statistical
data, which carriers may use to make intelligent, although independent,
decisions concerning rates. The benefits of such statistical organiza-
tions have been recognized and sanctioned by the federal courts in
antitrust proceedings as having a legitimate business purpose. The
rate bureau argued that even though free competition may be impeded
its data should not be available to independent carriers for only infor-
mational purposes since subscribership to a rating organization under
the all-industry type legislation means authorizing the bureau to make
all filings of the carrier. The court concluded that although the state
rating law precluded partial subscribership,247 a company could never-
theless subscribe to the bureau's services for all classes for informa-
tional purposes and at the same time make its own filings independently
for all such classes.
But the Mississippi Supreme Court construed narrowly the so-
called "designation clause" of the Mississippi casualty insurance
law.24 This clause permits a company to select whether to file under
the casualty rating law or the fire rating law, when both acts are
applicable to the proposed coverage, by filing with the insurance
commissioner "a designation as to which rate regulatory act" is
applicable. The designation clause was held inapplicable to homeown-
ers' policies. Thus the commissioner's rules .were sustained forbidding
the independent filing of coverage for both fire and casualty insurance
with an indivisible premium.
3. Independent Filings and the Aggrieved Party Issue
In 1954, at the same time NYFIRO commenced its long and
unsuccessful effort to destroy the right of partial subscribership, that
bureau and eight of its members launched an attack on Allstate Insur-
246 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sullivan, 56 Wash. 2d 251, 352 P.2d 193 (1960).
247 The statute provided that, except as to certain "grandfather" partial subscriber-
ship situations, "an insurer may ... authorize a rating organization to make all its filings
only, and may not make a portion of such filings on its behalf and authorize a rating
organization to make other such filings." Quoted in 56 Wash. 2d 251, 252-53, 352 P.2d 193,
194-95 (1960).
248 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Insurance Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 116 S.2d 224
(1960).
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ance Company's independent filing of dwelling fire and extended
coverage rates in New York. In petitioning the superintendent of
insurance for a hearing, NYFIRO alleged that Allstate's rates, which
were approximately twenty percent below the bureau's level, were
inadequate not only because they were unsupported by individual
dwelling experience of that company, but also because if NYFIRO
were to file similar rates they would be confiscatory for its member
companies. Allstate contested the right of the bureau to a hearing as an
aggrieved party. 49 In January 1955, the superintendent of insurance
issued an opinion concluding that the New York rating law did not
accord rating organizations or other competitors the right to a hearing
to contest an independent filing. ° NYFIRO appealed, but while
the appeal was pending, a new superintendent called a hearing at
NYFIRO's request and permitted NYFIRO to be heard. The court
therefore ruled that the appeal was moot.25 1 In July 1955, after
extensive hearings, the superintendent upheld Allstate's filing, but
changed the rate reduction from approximately twenty percent to
approximately fifteen percent below the bureau's rates.252 Both parties
appealed and the matter was subject to a succession of complicated
appeals and cross-appeals for four years before it was finally resolved
in 1959 in Cullen v. Holz.253
The New York Appellate Division, in a memorandum decision
entered without an opinion, unanimously confirmed the superinten-
dent's order approving Allstate's modified filing, and dismissed
NYFIRO's appeal.25 ' The court stated: "In so holding, it is concluded
249 Two sections of the all-industry bills confer standing upon a class described as
"aggrieved." Section 5(d) provides that "Any person or rating organization aggrieved
with respect to any filing which is in effect may make written application to the (com-
missioner) for a hearing thereon . . . 2" Section 16(a) provides that "Any insurer or
rating organization aggrieved by any order or decision of the (commissioner) made
without a hearing, may . . . make written request to the (commissioner) thereon. The
(commissioner) shall hear such party or parties .. . " See Comment, 58 Mich. L. Rev.
730 (1960).
250 In the Matter of Petition of NYFIRO and Eight Individual Members for a Hear-
ing Relating to the Fire Dwelling Rate Filings of the Allstate Ins. Co., N.Y. Ins. Dep't.,
Jan. 27, 1955.
251 Cullen v. Holz, 152 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
252 In the Matter of Independent Filing of Fire Rates by Allstate Ins. Co., N.Y. Ins.
Dep't. July 1, 1955.
253 181 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1958), aff'd without opinion, 6 N.Y.2d
971, 161 N.E.2d 392 (1959). For more detailed account of the extensive hearings and
litigation in this case, see Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 2, 1251-55.
254 181 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1958).
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that petitioners are aggrieved parties.1255 This one-sentence conclusion
is obviously very narrow in scope. At most it amounts only to a holding
that although the superintendent had elected in his discretion to call a
hearing and permit the bureau to intervene and become a party, the
bureau would be deemed a party aggrieved by the superintendent's
order for purposes of giving the court jurisdiction to rule on the order.
It was not held that a bureau has the right to demand a hearing con-
cerning an independent filing in the first instance, or to go to court
for relief, if the superintendent does not choose to call a hearing and
allow the bureau to intervene.
Also, in 1959, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
since certain orders relating to insurance rates were not addressed to
an agent's association and neither took nor attempted to take any
right, privilege, or property directly from it, the association had no
status as a "party aggrieved."256 The association attempted to contest
the validity of an order approving a rate change which involved
recomputing the rate base by reducing from twenty-five to twenty
percent the allowance for commissions. The requirement imposed by
the court of a direct proprietary interest for one to be an aggrieved
party should be applicable to determining the status of rate bureaus
which challenge independent carriers.
Following this litigation, and therefore somewhat belatedly,
several state insurance commissioners noted the necessity of preventing
competitors from burdening independence by asserting a status as an
aggrieved person.257 One of the primary reasons for the commissioners'
position is that bureaus, claiming to be aggrieved persons do not act
on behalf of the public, but rather in defense of their own price struc-
ture.258
B. Contemporary Proposals for Revisions of the Rating Laws
During 1958-59 the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted a rather exhaustive
investigation of state regulation of insurance. Hearings on state regula-
tion of insurance rates were held in 1959.259 The subcommittee recom-
mended measures for strengthening state administrative supervision
255 Id.
256 Virginia Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Virginia, 201 Va. 249, 110 S.E.2d 223 (1959).
257 E.g., address of NAIC President Northington, 1959 Proceedings 37, 40; statement
of New Hampshire Commissioner Knowlton, Hearings, pt. 3, 1844-45.
25S Hearings, pt. 2, 1262, 1316; pt. 3, 1795, 1835. See also McHugh, "Rate Regulation
Revisited: A Point of View of a Federal Official," in Insurance and Government 385, 395
(Center & Heins eds. 1962).
259 Hearings, pts. 2-3.
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by obtaining more qualified personnel, by increasing budgets of state
insurance departments, and the like.260 Recommendations also were
made such as eliminating mandatory bureau membership, denying
rating bureaus the status of aggrieved persons, eliminating the require-
ment for annual filings of deviations, and adopting the fie-and-use
261provision.
While the Senate hearings were being conducted, the NAIC
decided to hold its own hearings concerning the entire system of state
regulation to determine how it could be improved. 262 In late 1960, the
subcommittee appointed to make the study proposed that the NAIC
recommend to the states that rating organizations be denied the status
of an aggrieved person, that the annual renewal requirement for
deviations be eliminated, and that the fire and casualty bills be con-
solidated.263 Almost two years later the NAIC approved amendments
to the all-industry legislation, as proposed by its subcommittee, denying
the status to rate bureaus of aggrieved persons and modifying the
deviation section to allow deviations to remain in effect until withdrawn
by the insurer or until otherwise terminated. 264 In 1963, the NAIC
approved an amendment to consolidate the fire and casualty rating
laws to foster the development of multiple line package policies.265
What is significant about these NAIC proposals is that they are a
number of years behind principles which the industry was forced to
establish in the courts. The NAC seems not only conservative in its
leadership in insurance regulation; it often appears as a reactionary
force.
Meanwhile, the increasing emphasis upon competitive rate making
from the late 1940's until the early 1960's has not been effected without
accompanying problems. For example, in each year from 1962 through
1966 underwriting losses 6  have been suffered in the following lines:
straight fire, homeowners multiple peril, automobile bodily injury
260 S. Rep. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 239-47 (1960).
261 S. Rep. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-29 (1961).
262 See 1961 Proceedings 343-44, 347 for a brief history of the NAIC Subcommittee
to Review Fire and Casualty Rating Laws and Regulations.
263 1961 Proceedings 346-48.
264 1962 Proceedings 502-05, 525.
265 1963 Proceedings 349, 351, 651-52, 654-66. For a discussion of multiple line insur-
ance, see R. Hensley, Competition, Regulation and the Public Interest in Nonlife Insurance
107-15; Winter, The multiple Line Concept, in N.Y. State Ins. Dept., Examinations of
Insurance Companies 527 (1953).
266 Underwriting loss is a statutory figure taken from the annual statements of
stock companies, representing a comparison of claim losses and operating expenses in-
curred with premiums earned. Best's Fire and Casualty Aggregates and Averages iv (1967).
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liability, and automobile property damage liability. 67 Since 1955
the stock companies have incurred an underwriting loss equal to
approximately one and one-half billion dollars, with homeowners
and automobile liability insurance the chief contributors to the losses.26
The companies have been able to survive only by nearly doubling their
premiums, assets, and surpluses. The key to their survival has been
their rising investment income. For example, in 1965 the stock
companies enjoyed an aggregate one and one-half billion dollar invest-
ment profit269 while incurring a four hundred twenty-five million dollar
underwriting loss.
These continued underwriting losses have been attributed specif-
ically to (1) sharp price competition precipitated by the deviating and
independent companies, driving underwriters to innovations to broaden
coverage, and refining classifications and differentials, which have
failed to produce underwriting profits; (2) rising claim costs; (3)
lagging underwriting experience development; and (4) the reluctance
of state authorities to approve rate increases, causing many companies
to restrict their underwriting to certain areas and to certain classes
of property, giving rise to substandard high-risk companies, some
sixty-five of which have failed in recent years.
207 Id. at 18-20, 26-27. Figures for statutory losses of mutual companies are not
reported.
268 "Review and Preview," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Jan. 1967, at 10.
269 Investment profit is a statutory figure taken from the annual statements of the
companies, listing stocks at market value, but bonds not in default at amortized value.
Best's Fire and Casualty Aggregates and Averages iv (1967).
In every state, except Kentucky, Maryland, and Virginia, property and casualty com-
panies are not required to figure any portion of investment profits into calculations of
underwriting losses or profits for the purpose of establishing rates. The principal argument
in favor of this practice is that since insurance companies take the risks of investing, they
are entitled to the returns. It is reasoned that since policyholders do not make up invest-
ment losses, they should not benefit from investment profits through the use of such profits
to reduce premiums. The Kentucky insurance commissioner ruled recently that investment
profits on unearned premium reserves and loss reserves must be used to offset automobile
insurance rate increases. Unearned premium reserves are that portion of the policyholder's
payment that has not been "earned" by the company because the policy has some time to
run. Loss reserves are monies set aside to pay claims on losses which have arisen, but on
which no settlement has been reached. The ruling of the Kentucky commissioner applies
only to interest and dividend income from investments; it does not include capital gains
or losses. In Maryland, rate adjustments are required to take into account investment
profits from unearned premium reserves. In Virginia, it has been held -that investment
income, if considered at all, should be limited to that produced from investment of
unearned premium reserves. The existing practice has been attacked by critics outside the
insurance industry. See Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 6; Feb. 23, 1967, at 5, col. 1
(midwest ed.); Moseley, "Investment Income and Ratemaking," Best's Fire & Cas. News,
June 1967, at 24.
270 "Review and Preview," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Jan. 1967, at 10, 12-13.
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The most significant of these reasons for underwriting losses
seems to be the political pressures on the insurance commissioners, who
frequently prevent meritorious rate increases. 7' "Wait until this
election is over before you ask for approval of your rate increase"
appears to be a remark which is frequently made; nor does a commis-
sioner always like to give an increase just after his own election or
appointment by a newly elected governor, for the commissioner is
trying to "start out well." The failure to secure rate increases creates
pressures on companies to withdraw from the market and sometimes
jeopardizes a company whose business is concentrated in a frugal state.
As a result of these underwriting losses, the independent insurers
have urged the modification of the all-industry laws. The basic plea
has been for the enactment of a file-and-use provision in all states.
Such a provision permits the immediate use of rates, once filed with the
state insurance commissioner; no prior approval is required. The argu-
ment in favor of this provision is that it permits the industry to respond
to immediate needs and reverses the continued underwriting losses in
automobile, homeowners, and fire insurance 27 2 Thus the deviators and
independents now seek to secure rate increases rather than rate
decreases as in the past.
The desirability of the file-and-use provision was urged by the
Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee in its report on the
insurance industry.273 As result of the report, a bill was drafted for the
District of Columbia to revise its laws for comprehensive fire and
casualty regulation. 74 The bill would have eliminated prior approval
of rates, although rate filings would have been required. Rate changes
were to become effective upon filing. In addition, the bill would have
removed the one-year period of effectiveness of rate deviations, com-
pulsory membership in the District's fire rate bureau, and the standing
of rate bureaus as aggrieved parties. The purpose of the bill was to
provide a model for the states to follow in revising their legislation to
271 See Kemper, "The Federal Signposts: Danger Ahead," 1967 Ins. L.J. 267; State-
ment of Insurance Company of North America before the NAIC Subcommittee of the
Rates and Rating Committee, 1965 Proceedings 569-78; Hearings, pt. 2, 1206.
272 See statement of Insurance Company of North America before NAIC Sub-
committee of the Rates and Rating Organizations Committee, 1965 Proceedings 569-78.
273 S. Rep. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 117-19 (1961). The arguments in favor of
the file-and-use provision are summarized at page 118 of the report.
274 S. 2907, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). For a discussion of the bill, see Dineen,
Procter & Gardner, "The Economics and Principles of Insurance Supervision," in Insurance
and Government 1, 34-36 n.81 (Center & Hens eds. 1962); McHugh, "Rate Regulation
Revisited: The Point of View of a Federal Official," in Insurance and Government 385,
411-17 (Center & Hens eds. 1962).
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eliminate the criticism of state regulation made in the Senate reports
on the insurance industry.275
No action was taken on the bill in the 86th Congress. It was
reintroduced in 1961;78 again no action was taken. In 1963, Senator
Kefauver reintroduced the bill27 7 and urged its enactment,17  but no
action was taken. Since 1963 the bill has not been reintroduced.
Some observers are concerned that a file-and-use provision would
not constitute state regulation within the meaning of the proviso of
section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act. Basically these fears arise from the
statement in 1944 of Attorney General Biddle that the practice in those
states which simply permit rate bureaus to fix rates comes in conflict
with federal law. He observed that if the states wished to be free of the
antitrust laws they must assume responsibility for actually fixing rates
or approving rates filed with them; otherwise the public is not pro-
tected.279 However, in 1962, the Department of Justice supported the
proposed amendments to the District of Columbia law28° and referred
to the California regulatory system, which does not even require
advance filing of rates, as providing an atmosphere under which the
insurance industry thrives without a single failure due to inadequate
rates. The question remains whether the present attorney general and
his successors would consider the file-and-use provision as tantamount
to state regulation. To date no one has attacked the provision in those
states where it has been enacted. 81
The California and Idaho regulatory schemes differ significantly
from the all-industry regulatory pattern. Under California law advance
filing or approval of rates is not required; rates are not deemed
excessive unless there is a lack of competition; and rates are not
deemed inadequate unless the insurer's solvency is threatened or low
rates are used in concert to force a monopoly.2 82 The theory is that
competition will keep rates down without the commissioner's meddling.
The greedy insurer will lose the business to his thriftier competitor;
275 S. Rep. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. Rep. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
276 S. 568, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
277 S. 1184, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
278 109 Cong. Rec. 4787-88 (1963).
279 joint Hearings supra note 58 at 638 (1944).
280 Statement of Lee Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of justice, before the Subcommittee of Business and Commerce on the District of
Columbia, Press Release, June 21, 1962, at 1.
281 Delaware, District of Columbia (casualty), Maine, Massachusetts (except com-
pulsory automobile liability insurance), Ohio (casualty), and Wyoming.
282 For comments on the California and Idaho regulatory schemes by the insurance
departments of those states, see 1966 Proceedings 487-95.
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and it is apparent that the public is sufficiently protected against
excessive rates. The California and Idaho laws have never been tested
in court so the possibility exists that these laws do not regulate within
the meaning of the McCarran Act.
The urging by insurance companies for elimination of the prior
approval provision of the all-industry laws has not impressed the state
insurance commissioners. In 1965, the NAIC submitted a question-
naire to commissioners in fifty-four jurisdictions; forty-seven re-
sponded.8 3 Thirty-two commissioners felt that a file-and-use provision
would not be desirable, and forty believed that the California type of((no filing" provision would be undesirable, mainly because it would
precipitate "cutthroat competition," although twenty-nine commis-
sioners admitted that they were not familiar with the California statute.
The purpose of the questionnaire was to furnish data for the NAIC's
Rates and Rating Organizations Subcommittee's study of state rate
regulation, designed to determine whether rate regulation is working
in the manner intended at the time such legislation was adopted. 84
The subcommittee had been urged by the insurance industry to
propose a major overhaul of the rate regulatory laws.285
The results of the questionnaire indicate that there is not much
unanimity of opinion regarding changes that might be made, and often
the responses seemed inconsistent. Ninety-one percent of the jurisdic-
tions indicated that their present laws allowed price competition;
eighty-seven percent indicated that their laws allowed service competi-
tion; eighty-three percent believed that their rates and rules met
the statutory standards with respect to all lines of insurance or types
of risks. Yet only nineteen percent of the commissioners felt that they
had an adequate staff of actuaries or other rating experts, and forty-
nine percent indicated that their departments do not have sufficient
information to determine the accuracy of statistics contained in rate
proposals.
Apparently the NAIC subcommittee is still studying the results
of the questionnaire, for in June 1966, the subcommittee adopted a
motion to continue its analysis of the answers and to continue its study
of rates, rating organizations, and rating laws.288
Barring amendment of rating laws to permit immediate use of rate
filings, the number of rate cases will undoubtedly increase. The presi-
dent of Home Insurance Company, a large property and casualty in-
283 The questionnaire and tabulated results appear in 1966 Proceedings 447-49, 471-86.
284 1965 Proceedings 200.
285 1965 Proceedings 566-67.
286 1966 Procecdings 446.
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surer, has said that many people in the industry hold the view that in
some states it is next to impossible to receive favorable action on rate
increases when an election is in the offing, and recourse in court
involves a lengthy delay before relief can be secured. During this
inevitable delay, companies continue to suffer from inadequate rates.
As a result, the tendency in the past has been to compromise on unprof-
itable rates. Now it is realized that despite the delay, the companies
must resort to the courts to receive rate adjustments as dictated by the
statistics.87
And while the NAIC has failed to recommend statutory changes
to assure greater flexibility in insurance rate making, in 1966 three
independent studies urged such flexibility. At the request of the
Virginia State Corporation Commission, a New York actuarial firm
conducted a study of passenger car liability insurance. It recommended
open competition as the simplest formula for rate regulation. In
Florida, the insurance commissioner appointed a committee of business-
men to investigate and report on automobile safety and insurance
rating. The group concluded that a file-and-use measure would generate
competition and stabilize rates by eliminating the need for large annual
increases. At the same time the group affirmed the need for rate
bureaus as the collectors, verifiers, and transfer agencies of experience
from the individual company to the state insurance department. The
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, a private research group
made up of legislators, educators, businessmen, labor people, and others
recommended that Louisiana permit speedy implementation of rate
changes and more flexibility in the rate structure by adopting the file-
and-use method for both rates and classes of automobile and dwelling
insurance.2s8
IX. CONCLUSION
An atmosphere favorable to the intervention of Congress into the
emaciated state regulatory pattern is becoming more apparent. For
example, as a result of the 1965 Senate hearings on the substantial
number of failures of high risk automobile insurers,8 9 legislation was
introduced in the first session of the 90th Congress to establish a
287 See United States Investor, Jan. 3, 1966, at 36.
288 Subsequently, Louisiana adopted a modified version of the file-and-use rate
provision, under which rates are effective when filed as long as there are no changes in
classifications or expense factors. "Significant Studies Advocate More Flexibility in Insur-
ance Rating," Best's Fire & Cas. News, Oct. 1966, at 10.
289 Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 12.
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federal motor vehicle insurance guaranty corporation."' An exhaustive
investigation of the automobile insurance industry is being prepared
with the effectiveness of state regulation of rates one of the topics for
study.291 Among the recommendations of the investigation may be the
control of automobile insurance by the federal government in conjunc-
tion with its asserted jurisdiction over matters concerning automobile
safety. In addition, a recent staff study of automobile insurers by the
House Judiciary Committee concludes that existing state regulation
of rates is inadequate. The report calls for a further investigation by
the FTC.292
State regulation of the property and casualty insurance business
in the United States represents a rather unique history of the relation-
ship between the responsibilities of the states and the federal govern-
ment. Since 1868, except for a brief nine-month period in 1944-45,
insurance has been virtually immune from federal regulation. Follow-
ing the SEUA decision in 1944 the regulatory power of the states was
reaffirmed by legislative fiat. The states were afforded the opportunity
to demonstrate their ability to implement a model program demonstrat-
ing the states' ability to deal with an industry whose activities have
interstate implications. Today the states are still struggling to provide
adequate, effective regulation, but the concern continues to be focused
on legislation. In the last few months numerous bills have been intro-
duced concerning rate regulation.293 There are some indications that
the absence of underwriting profits and the companies' restrictions
on the lines and types of business they write will precipitate legislation
aimed at securing adequate rates and broadening the availability of
290 E.g., S. 688; H.R. 4004-08, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See Dineen, Procter &
Gardner, "The Economics and Principles of Insurance Supervision," in Insurance and
Government 1, 53-55 n.140 (Center & Heins eds. 1962), for forty-one activities of the
federal government in connection with insurance. Senator Young of Ohio has called for
repeal of the McCarran Act and the complete return of insurance regulation to the federal
government. Kemper, "The Federal Signposts: Danger Ahead," 1967 Ins. L.J. 267, 271-72.
291 Newsweek, July 17, 1967, at 69; August 21, 1967, at 54.
292 Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1967, at 8, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
293 Bills have been introduced in Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Dakota aimed
at revising rate regulatory patterns, including such proposals as creating a state rate
bureau to assist in fixing and establishing reasonable premium charges for compulsory
vehicle liability insurance; providing for immediate open filing of rates, rate plans, rate
classes, and modifications for casualty and surety insurance; authorizing the state super-
intendent of insurance to approve assigned risk plans for fire insurance; and completely
revising the regulatory system in fire, casualty, and surety rates. For a synopsis of the bills




insurance to parties representing high risks. Intense rate competition
will not be allowed to flourish in a regulatory atmosphere which
fosters insolvencies, growing selectivity of risks, and voluntary with-
drawal from certain markets as has recently occurred in some jurisdic-
tions. Legislation is not the panacea although one may wish to believe
that it is or should be. Also, the genesis of the all-industry bills demon-
strates that too many powerful special interests are concerned with
state regulatory legislation for it to reflect the efficacious implementa-
tion of meaningful goals.
State regulation can grow in stature and achieve freedom from
political subservience. Such regulation must have as its foundation
sound administrative regulation where by reasoned argument and
actuarial proof it can successfully control and direct competition in
the public interest. Whether this is possible at the state level where
the staffs, budgets, and levels of expertise are meager in relation to
the burdensome responsibility is questionable. A real and growing
possibility exists that unless the states adequately regulate rate making
promptly, the federal government will assume administrative control
of the field. Such entry will undoubtedly lead to its virtual total
occupation and conceivably to appropriation of the substantial insur-
ance tax revenues which now go largely to the states.
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